

# Lisbon Philosophy Graduate Workshop

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## Book of Abstracts

*Jus in Bello in Jus ad Bellum*

Diogo Santos (LanCog)

According to the traditionalist view on Just War Theory the moral principles that govern how some wars are morally justifiable (*Jus ad Bellum*) are separated and unrelated with the moral principles which govern whether the conduct of war is ought to be morally condemned (*Jus in Bello*). This means that unjustified wars can involve permissible conduct and that justified wars can involve impermissible conduct. Specifically for *Jus in Bello*, traditionalists endorse the following three principles:

- Discrimination. Targeting noncombatants is impermissible.
- Proportionality. The non-targeted harming must be proportionate to the military advantage achieved.
- Necessity. The least harmful means feasible must be used.

Although Discrimination provides an important moral protection for noncombatants, Proportionality and Necessity determine the condition in which noncombatants can be permissibly harmed. In this paper I argue that any adequate justification for noncombatants permissibly being harmed necessitates an appeal to *Jus ad Bellum* moral principles, which entails that the deep moral divide between *Jus in Bello* and *Jus ad Bellum* is nonexistent.

## *Topic Theoretic Invariantism*

Francisca Silva (LanCog)

I want to consider joining motivations from the invariantist movement in defining the logical vocabulary and the widespread notion that logic ought to be topic-neutral. Both tendencies go hand-in-hand in a very natural way. If logical constants are what remains invariant under any relevant transformations, then it is natural to claim that they do not contribute to the content of what is said under any of those variations. So, if one claims, as many now begin to do (Yablo, 2014; Hawke, 2018; Plebani and Spolaore, 2021; Berto, 2022, Ferguson, 2023c) that subject matters are a component of content in their own right, then logical constants shouldn't contribute to the topics of expressions in which they figure. My own proposal starts by identifying various forms of subject matter transparency in models assigning subject matters to meaningful expressions of a first-order language with identity relative to worlds, and showing that different expressions that have been considered to be part of the logical vocabulary in different ways (for instance extensional versus intensional logical constants) don't contribute to the subject matter of the expressions they feature in in different ways.

## *How to Interpret Interpretivism?*

Gabriel Malagutti (LanCog)

Dennett's Interpretivism is ambiguous between two kinds of behaviourism: peripheral and molecular. Peripheral considers external behaviour that is readily accessible to the observer, whilst molecular includes bodily and brain changes as behaviour. I will argue that there is no interesting definite distinction between the two accounts, for the distinction will differ according to the observer, conditions, and the observed object. Faced with this result, I will argue that behaviour is behaviour. That is, what counts as behaviour is not whether it is observable in the skin or inside it. What is relevant for a given theory of mind is given by an ideal interpreter. Additionally, by endorsing this account, one is able to defend interpretivism against the three most discussed counter cases to behaviourism, cases where agents either have the dispositional behaviour but lack the necessary psychology, or cases where agents have the psychology but lack the corresponding dispositional behaviour. Both kinds attempt to falsify the supervenience thesis, that necessarily, if two organisms are behaviourally exactly alike, they are psychologically exactly alike. By adopting the proposed account of behaviour, however, one is able to correctly discriminate the agent's behaviour in accordance with their psychology. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by elucidating on the appropriate interpretation of Dennett's view and defending it against the main objections to the account.

## *A Phenomenological Approach to the Ontological Status of Moral Experiences*

Henrique Augusto (HPhil)

In this paper, I argue that moral experiences, understood phenomenologically—as they are subjectively given—are given through the lens of subjectivity while still recognizing its possible unknown, objective validity. While we perceive these experiences as "right" or "wrong," they remain open to error, unlike sensory experiences, which we assume to have intersubjective consistency. To clarify the ontological domain of moral experience and achieve an accurate phenomenological account of morality, I employ both the descriptive method of phenomenology and a logical-formal analysis of the mental structure underlying our moral experiences. Through this approach, I demonstrate that we often attribute potential objective value to moral judgments, acknowledging that our perception of an act's moral status might differ from its actual moral status.

## *Kant on the Subjective Side of Empirical Cognition*

João Amorety (HPhil)

Kant's position on the empirical cognition of the specific laws of nature is complicated by an ambivalence between the fact that these laws express necessary connections in our perception of objects and the fact that no necessity can ever be shown in experience. Kant agrees with Hume on the point that the specific laws of nature cannot be known *a priori* but adds that the possibility of these laws can still be grounded *a priori*: it is a transcendental principle of experience that every change in phenomena is determined by antecedent conditions, which entails that empirical reality follows necessary causal connections. Now, Kant's complicated stand on this issue makes it difficult to settle the dispute on which kind of validity suits empirical cognition: in fact, his position only stabilizes in the *Critique of Judgment*, where he states that, although the objectivity of our empirical judgments is problematic, they enjoy intersubjective currency insofar as the act of abstracting them from experience can still be grounded on certain transcendental principles of judgment. Kant thus uncovers a subjective side to empirical cognition, a discovery which then allows him to relate the uncovering of empirical laws to a specific feeling of pleasure, i.e. to a specific mode of the promotion of the subjective life of our faculties which cannot, however, be confused with pure aesthetical pleasure. My presentation will examine some of the implications of this connection between cognition and feeling.

*The Constitutive Agon: Nietzsche's Ontological Inversion and Mouffe's Reformulation of the Political.*

João Rochate da Palma (Praxis)

The *agon* is not merely an ideal reconfiguration of the antagonism at the heart of society, but, as it will be shown, its constitutive role regarding the *individual*, the *social* and the *political* stems out of an ontological inversion present in Nietzsche's *oeuvre* with varied implications.

The Nietzschean inversion subordinates *being* to *becoming* in three specific elements: 1) how this subordination implies the primacy of fluidity; 2) how this *becoming* occurs agonistically through opposite affirmation in the individual and the social in their simultaneity; 3) and how this constitutive agon makes difference the central aspect of the question of *meaning*, to which there is none fixed, but rather concepts which are depositories of it.

From here, we must make a stop at Laclau's conception of *floating signifiers*, and how these are applied to Mouffe's reformulation of the concept of the political. Firstly, because the absence of fixed meaning opens the space for pluralism; secondly, because this difference generates a plurality of motivations emphasizing affectivity rather than a *public reason*; and thirdly, it implies then an attempt to define the political near Schmitt's conception, yet taking another route which seeks to perpetuate conflict through an agonistic logic.

Thus, agonism's inner structure reveals the inner play of meaning and contradictions within the individual, but as well the external play of differences and tensions which give concepts their meanings in a counter-pressure (*gegenpress*) out of which the sparks generated by friction are the exercise of *meaning-building* also in socio-political terms.

*Hecataeus, Nietzsche, Foucault: genealogy as a style*

Maura Ceci (Praxis)

The aim of this paper is to propose 'genealogy of genealogy' in order to highlight an aspect that have been largely overshadowed both by contemporary scholarship, namely genealogy as a stylistic choice and a philosophical genre. Contemporary discussions over genealogy as philosophical tool are concerned whether it proposes a normative ground (Habermas, Taylor, Koopman, Kelly) or as an instrument for political and social critique (Allen, Lorenzini). By comparing how genealogy has been employed by following three main authors attached to it (Hecataeus of Miletus, Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault), I isolated three aspects that, I believe, structurally define genealogy as a philosophical style *sui generis*. First, the rejection of metaphysical standpoint of interpretation in favour of an – highly ambiguous – subjective perspective. Second, a specific relation to truth, where truth it is not something existing *per se*, but it is a product of discursive practices. Thirdly, genealogy is also a parody. This last aspect forces

the genealogist to constantly rethink her subjective perspective and the truth claims attached to it. This farcical/parodical feature establishes between the subject and truth a playful dynamic, for which subject and truth are constantly subverted, demolished and recreated. This dynamic fits well with contemporary readings of genealogy since it shows how genealogy: (1) can provide an immanent and subjective perspective over the object of critique while at the same time this perspective, although immanent, it is not fixed but constantly shifting and (2) it forces the subject to take a stance regarding the object of critique in front of her, driving the subject to adopt a normative standpoint.

*What Moral Characteristics Should an Elected Representative Have?*

Rui Antunes (FLUL)

The purpose of this presentation is to define the moral characteristics that an elected representative should have, in order to, in the exercise of his given power, produce the best possible consequences, that is, the highest amount of welfare distributed as equally as possible, for its citizens.

In this work, we will discuss the three main moral qualities that a representative should have: honesty, impartiality and honour. In a broader sense, we will argue that honesty implies telling the truth, but not in all cases, impartiality demands looking at the citizens as such and not as electors or the fragment of electorate that voted for the representative, and finally, honour is the capacity to make and to act accordingly to the serious intention of fulfilling a commitment. It will be shown that these moral features are linked in a way that imply one another, e.g. it is not possible to act impartially without being honest, in a certain way, impartiality demands honesty in order to avoid *biased* actions. After, it will be argued that the combination of these characteristics produces the highest amount of welfare, and we will consider some problematic cases where, apparently, not acting accordingly with, at least, one of these moral features is the choice that produces the highest amount of welfare.

*A Notable Footnote – Yet another Marxist breadcrumb*

Rui Filipe (HPhil)

What survives of Marx's 1841 doctoral dissertation indicates a work focused on an ancient philosophy problem. Entitled *The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, Marx investigates just that – why two philosophers, with systems based on the same thing, the atom, have completely different worldviews. Marx defends that the subjectivistic nature of Epicurus' philosophy elucidates how the latter develops the immanent contradictions in the concept of the atom. With this reasoning, Marx would solve the ancient philosophical problem by explaining the mentioned *difference* and showing how Epicurus advanced Democritus' atomistic thought.

However, 16 years later, Marx writes to Lassalle that his dissertation's subject matter was due to "[political] rather than philosophical [...] reasons". Faced with this statement, it is difficult to comprehend what the true subject of Marx's doctoral thesis. Notwithstanding, I propose to present an answer based on a footnote that survived of Marx's dissertation.

Being from a lacunar section, it is impossible to indicate its specific target. What can be ascertained, however, is that in it Marx parallels Epicurus' philosophical time to the one of the young-Hegelians. This allows us to extrapolate, *mutatis mutandis*, the arguments utilized by Marx concerning Epicurus and apply them to his philosophical time. It would then be possible to locate Marx's dissertation as a contribution to the philosophical debates, always with a political flavor, of the Hegelian environment. By doing so, Marx in 1841 presents themes which will undoubtedly catalyze his young intellectual development later.