Paolo Furia

University of Turin

The Substantivity of Landscape. Learning from the Andes?

5 December 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon



In this talk will offer some arguments with a view to overcoming an “aestheticized” conception of landscape, which has been prevalent particularly in European and, to some extent, North American philosophical aesthetics. The main feature of such conception is the reduction of the concept of landscape to a construct based on the isolation of the aesthetic properties of a given portion of space from other kinds of properties, such as geographical, political or ecological ones. I will devote the first part of the talk to reconstructing the main pillars of the “aestheticized” conception of landscape, relying on the influential essay by Joachim Ritter (1963) and the criteria identified by Augustin Berque for the identification of so-called “landscape cultures” (2008). In the second part I will focus on some characteristics of the Andean landscape, referring as much to a field experience lived as part of a visiting period at the Universidad Nacional de Huancavelica and the Universidad para el Desarrollo Andino, as to the philosophical, anthropological and geographical debate around the concept of landscape in the Andean “cosmovision.” In the third and last part I will show how the “aestheticized” conception of landscape is inadequate to understand the landscape culture of the Andean world, in which the aesthetic function, far from being denied, is nonetheless found integrated with other dimensions of spatial reality, such as geographical, ethico-political and ecological. Of such insertion of the aesthetic into the ethical and ecological sphere I will try to show, in conclusion, the intimate urgency in the time of the Anthropocene.



Dirk Michael Hennrich


Posthuman Landscapes: Pathways through the Anthropocene

28 November 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon



The future habitability of landscapes in the context of the current dramatic climate changes worldwide depends on a fundamental paradigm shift in our ethical and political relationships. The Anthropocene, which must be understood not only as a geological phase of natural history but also as a civilizational phase of human history, is characterized by extreme anthropocentric action. Still not officially recognized as a new geological epoch, the term Anthropocene is to be understood above all as an operative term that encourages us to think about the human himself and his future on earth. It is a term that complements the term Gaia and is inextricably linked to Earth system science and the problem of climate change. My lecture assumes that thinking about posthuman landscapes, as a common ground for a future ethics and politics beyond the Anthropocene, must follow a double approach; on the one hand, the Philosophy of Landscape and, on the other, the Animal Philosophy.  The landscape, understood as the specific environment and biome in which humans are inserted alongside all other forms of life; and the non-human beings, the radical alterity and origin of human self-constitution and self-reflection.  Both philosophical disciplines question the relationship of humans to the non-human without closing themselves off to the question of technology.



Jan Straßheim

University of Hildesheim

Misunderstanding as the Basis of Social Action: Alfred Schutz’s Pragmatic Phenomenology

21 November 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon



According to social phenomenologist Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), individual perspectives and social structures shape one another through the medium of action. His view implies a central place of social action, i.e., action inherently oriented towards other people. Common sense, as well as influential social philosophers (e.g., Habermas, Searle), stress “understanding” as the basis of social action. However, Schutz’s analysis can help us see that misunderstanding plays an even more fundamental role that is often overlooked. What is ordinarily called “understanding” builds on several interrelated levels of misunderstanding. Most fundamentally, the tension between the selectivity of action and the fullness of “lived experience” (Bergson) is a fruitful “self-misunderstanding.” Selectivity enables individuals to mutually coordinate their actions by ignoring most of what they are or could be. Socially shared “types” channel such coordination by abstracting away from contextual and individual differences. However, unlike “rules,” types are flexible and allow us to tap back into the fullness of lived experience to recover these differences. Action is an essentially open process which, in social action, involves a plurality of perspectives. This openness and plurality make social action a critical medium in which fundamental misunderstandings constantly motivate, test, and fine-tune understanding.



Organized by Mariana Teixeira and Silvia Locatelli

Working language: English
When: Fridays from 16h to 18h (according to the program below)
Format: hybrid
Where: Room B112.H (Library Building of the Faculdade de Letras – Universidade de Lisboa) and online (meeting link will be shared via email)
Please register via email:


Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is one of the most important – and difficult – texts in the history of philosophy, with its original mode of narrative that focuses on the development of human consciousness and spirit over time, introducing the idea of dialectical progression where ideas and concepts evolve through contradiction.

Since its first publication in 1806-1807, it has captivated generations of philosophers and social theorists, having influenced many schools of thought, such as Marxism, existentialism, feminism and contemporary critical theory. But its importance can also be attested by the passionate responses it provoked among its critics, from Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to more recent approaches such as post-structuralism.

Through the collective reading of the integral text of the Phenomenology, we will attempt in this Reading Group to understand how action and knowledge develop in the course of the search for truth: of oneself and of the world, and in relation with otherness. We will follow the journey of consciousness through the many figures it encounters – including, for instance, the much discussed figures of the master-slave dialectics, the struggle for recognition, the unhappy consciousness, Antigone, and the beautiful soul – in order to grasp the role of experience in the consciousness’s path towards absolute knowing.


24/11/2023 – Presentation of the Reading Group

15/12/2023 – Preface, part 1 (until “To what extent is the Phenomenology of Spirit negative, or how is the false contained in it?”)

12/01/2024 – Preface, part 2 (from “Historical and mathematical truth” to the end)

26/01/2024 – Introduction

09/02/2024 – Chapter I, Consciousness: Sense-certainty

23/02/2024 – Chapter II, Consciousness: Perception

08/03/2024 – Chapter III, Consciousness: Force and understanding

22/03/2024 – Chapter IV.A, Self-Consciousness: The truth of self-certainty: Lordship and bondage

12/04/2024 – Chapter IV.B, Self-Consciousness: The truth of self-certainty: Stoicism, Skepticism and Unhappy consciousness

19/04/2024 – Chapter V.A.a, Reason: Observing reason: Observation of nature

03/05/2024 – Chapter V.A.b and c, Reason: Observing reason: Observation of self-consciousness: Logical and psychological laws; Physiognomy and Phrenology

17/05/2024 – Chapter V.B, Reason: Actualization of rational self-consciousness

07/06/2024 – Chapter V.C, Reason: Individuality

21/06/2024 – Chapter VI.A, Spirit: The true spirit – Ethical order

Irene Viparelli

University of Évora

“Diferença Marxiana” e Singularidade de L. Althusser

14 November 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon



A publicação póstuma dos manuscritos de L. Althusser tem acarretado uma Renaissance dos estudos dedicados ao filosofo francês. Neste contexto, a presente intervenção visa em primeiro lugar apresentar os principais enfoques da mais recente bibliografia sobre Althusser. De acordo com Montag (Althusser and His Contemporaries. Philosophy’s Perpetual War, Duke University Press, 2013) há duas abordagens produtivas ao pensamento de Althusser: por um lado, a publicação dos escritos sobre o “materialismo aleatório” tem permitido leituras que tendem a inserir a reflexão althusseriana no contexto filosófico da época, destacando a proximidade com o horizonte pós-estruturalista. Seria, assim, a pertença à especifica “conjuntura teórica francesa” que garantiria o persistente interesse teórico do pensamento de Althusser. Por outro lado, a publicação dos textos políticos sobre a “crise do marxismo” tem originado interpretações que fazem da reflexão de Althusser uma “intervenção na conjuntura política”; uma resposta teórica aos problemas colocados pelo estalinismo e pela “crise do marxismo”. Nesse quadro, o interesse da teoria de Althusser seria, no fundo, enraizado na sua indissolúvel inatualidade. A presente intervenção procura apresentar uma diferente hipótese de leitura que, mantendo organicamente ligadas as dimensões teórico-filosófica e política, visa realçar a especificidade da posição de Althusser relativamente ao horizonte pós-estruturalista, i. e., uma “diferença marxiana” que representa a singularidade do seu pensamento.



Darian Meacham

Maastricht University

Why potatoes aren’t institutions? Or why institutions might help the phenomenology of technology

31 October 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon



In this talk I have a fairly straightforward aim. I ask whether the phenomenological concept of “Institution” (Stiftung), which sometimes goes under the translation (into both French and English) foundation or establishment, can help to better articulate how phenomenology or phenomenological method can contribute to the philosophical examination of technology. I think that the answer is yes. Nonetheless, it is not clear from the outset that the concept of institution as developed in the phenomenological tradition and then further in certain branches of political theory can be rendered easily as a method or tool in the philosopher of technology’s quiver. The application of phenomenological method in the philosophy of technology under the umbrella of post-phenomenology has also come under recent criticism for being insufficiently attentive to questions of broader historical and political context (Cressman 2020), a classic critique of phenomenology, and as being insufficiently phenomenological (Ritter 2021). The aim here is not to intervene in these debates about the merits and shortcomings of post-phenomenological method in the philosophy of technology or whether post-phenomenology is sufficiently phenomenological but rather to understand how the concept of institution transformed phenomenological analysis and how this might be of some use in approaching the question of technology from a phenomenological perspective. Looking at institution in this way may also shed some light on the concept itself and help us to understand it’s limitations.



Reading Group as part of the Praxis-CFUL activities


Working language: English

Organizer: Dr. Ricardo Mendoza-Canales (rcanales [at]

Where: Room B112.E (Library Building)

When: Thursdays, from 14h00 to 16h00 (according to the calendar below)

To participate, please send an e-mail to the convenor expressing your interest in taking part in the RG.



For decades, Gilbert Simondon was just a name mentioned in a handful of footnotes in influential books by Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard or Herbert Marcuse. Although he belonged to the same generation of first-line French philosophers such as Deleuze, Foucault, or Derrida, Simondon remained almost unknown, far from fame and recognition. He soon gained a reputation as a philosopher of technology with the publication of his first and best-known work, Du mode d’existence des objects techniques (1958), which corresponds to his secondary doctoral dissertation defended that same year; but since it wasn’t a hot topic at the time, his work remained merely as a distant reference, only accessible in the French-speaking milieu. This, together with the vicissitudes of the publication of his main doctoral dissertation, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et information (split and published in two separate parts with a gap of more than thirty years between them), and the fact that Simondon’s intellectual interests were not part of the mainstream philosophies of his time and thus moved in a different direction from those of his contemporaries, confabulated against him to remain confined to a restricted field of research, so that his philosophical project, until very recently, could never be appreciated in its radical unity, consistency, breadth and depth.

Nowadays, the sustained publication of his unpublished works (accompanied by an important rhythm of translations into the most widely used philosophical languages) has made available to scholars a wider scope of his entire philosophical project, which, in a nutshell, consists in reassessing the relationship between nature and culture, describing it as process in which life and being are part of a one single operation of becoming. This ambitious task demands a profound reformulation of every philosophical field concerned with this relationship: metaphysics, theory of knowledge, ethics, aesthetics, philosophical anthropology. By restoring the centrality that the paradigm of technique plays in shaping all human interaction with the world, Simondon rejects the primacy of substantialism and the hylomorphic scheme (matter-form interaction) as the bedrock of the classical Western metaphysics. Conversely, he pleas for a theory of individuation in terms of information, in which being is in a continuous process of becoming through operations of structuring and amplification.


The purpose of this reading group is to introduce and deepen our understanding of Simondon’s theory of individuation. To this end, we will close-read in its entirety his major work, Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information. The goals are: 1) to unravel together the dense web of concepts unfolded in this work (such as individuation, singularity, pre-individual, ontogenesis, operation, metastability, transduction, modulation, allagmatics, transindividuality, etc.); 2) to explore the ontological, ethical, political, and aesthetic consequences of thinking of individuation as a process that takes place in different regimes of reality (physical, biological, psychic, social); and 3) to grasp the significance of this philosophy of nature and a “genetic encyclopedism” that Simondon advocates, as well as its implications in our digital age and technological environment.

The English translation is strongly recommended as primary reading, as the sessions will be conducted in English:

Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information. Vol. 1. Taylor Adkins (trans.). Minneapolis-London: University of Minnesota Press, 2020.


Other editions/translations:

(Original French edition) L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et information. 2eme. ed. Paris: J. Millon, 2013.

(Spanish) La individuation a la luz de las nociones de forma e información. 2a. ed. Pablo Ires (trad.). Buenos Aires: Cactus, 2013.

(Portuguese) A individuação à luz das noções de forma e informação. Luís Eduardo Ponciano Aragon e Guilherme Ivo (trad.). São Paulo: Editora 34, 2020.

(Italian) L’individuazione alla luce delle nozioni di forma e di informazione. 2a. ed. Giovanni Carrozzini (trad.). Milano: Mimesis, 2020.





Session 1 | 30 November 2023

Introduction (pp. 1-17)


Session 2 | 7 December 2023

Part I. Chap. 1. Form and Matter. I: “Foundations of the Hylomorphic Schema: Technology of Form-Taking” (pp. 21-36)


Session 3 | 14 December 2023

Part I. Chap. 1. Form and Matter. II: “Physical Signification of Technical Form-Taking” (pp. 37-47)


Session 4 | 18 January 2024

Part I. Chap. 1. Form and Matter. III: “The Two Aspects of Individuation” (pp. 47-54)


Session 5 | 25 January 2024

Part I. Chap. 2. Form and Energy (pp. 55-94)


Session 6 | 1 February 2024

Part I. Chap. 3. Form and Substance. I: “Continuous and Discontinuous” and II: “Particle and Energy” (pp. 95-125)


Session 7 | 8 February 2024

Part I. Chap. 3. III: “The Non-substantial Individual: Information and Compatibility” (pp. 126-164)


Session 8 | 15 February 2024

Part II. Chap. 1. Information and Ontogenesis: Vital Individuation. I: “Principles toward a Study of the Individuation of the Living

Being” (pp. 167-180)


Session 9 | 22 February 2024

Part II. Chap. 1. Information and Ontogenesis: Vital Individuation. II: “Specific Form and Living Substance” (pp. 180-208)


Session 10 | 29 February 2024

Part II. Chap. 1. Information and Ontogenesis: Vital Individuation. III: “Information and Vital Individuation” (pp. 208-225)


Session 11 | 7 March 2024

Part II. Chap. 1. Information and Ontogenesis: Vital Individuation. IVa: “Information and Ontogenesis” (pp. 225-244)


Session 12 | 14 March 2024

Part II. Chap. 1. Information and Ontogenesis: Vital Individuation. IVb: “Information and Ontogenesis” (pp. 244-256)


Session 13 | 21 March 2024

Part II. Chap. 2. Psychical Individuation. I: “Signification and the Individuation of Perceptive Units” (pp. 257-272)


Session 14 | 4 April 2024

Part II. Chap. 2. Psychical Individuation. II: “Individuation and Affectivity” (pp. 272-291)


Session 15 | 11 April 2024

Part II. Chap. 2. Psychical Individuation. IIIa: “Psychical Individuation and the Problematic of Ontogenesis” (pp. 291-308)


Session 16 | 18 April 2024

Part II. Chap. 2. Psychical Individuation.  IIIb: “Psychical Individuation and the Problematic of Ontogenesis” (pp. 308-326)


Session 17 | 2 May 2024

Part II. Chap. 3. Collective Individuation and the Foundations of the Transindividual. I: “The Individual and the Social, Group Individuation” (pp. 327-344)


Session 18 | 9 May 2024

Part II. Chap. 3. Collective Individuation and the Foundations of the Transindividual. II: “The Collective as Condition of Signification” (pp. 344-355)


Session 19 | 16 May 2024

Conclusion (pp. 356-380)



Tiago Carvalho

U Porto

Já Está Arranjado? Do Estatuto e Sentido da Reparação de Artefactos

24 October 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon



O título da minha comunicação baseia-se em larga medida no capítulo escrito para um livro ainda no prelo sobre manutenção e reparação de artefactos e infra-estruturas. A ideia ao longo da apresentação será explorarmos como a reparação de um artefacto levanta várias questões metafísicas e epistémicas. Será que reparar implica restaurar a função própria de um certo artefacto? E o que implica saber reparar um artefacto? Há alguma relação entre o saber científico e tecnológico necessário à construção de um artefacto e o saber necessário à respectiva reparação? Pode haver uma ciência da reparação? Para tentar responder a estas questões utilizarei conceitos da pós-fenomenologia e de teorias metafísicas da função de artefactos de forma a avançar com uma teoria geral da reparação que coloca a ênfase no sentido que um certo artefacto cumpre no mundo da vida dos seus utilizadores. Pretendo também estabelecer como a natureza do saber necessário à reparação é um saber prático, tácito e altamente contextualizado, mas precisamente por isso, um saber frágil e precário. A reparação é uma acção hermenêutica que abre a caixa negra do artefacto e põe em jogo a sua ambiguidade, i.e., e a forma como as intenções e as formas de vida dos utilizadores interagem com as intenções dos fautores dos artefactos. Essa ambiguidade é por sua vez posta em evidência através da forma como a transferência de artefactos entre diferentes culturas gera diferentes interpretações sobre a sua função.


Grupo de Leitura Filosofia Animal – 6º ciclo

Sobre a alma e a razão dos animais: perspectivas históricas

Início: 19 de Outubro 2023 |  Término: 21 de Dezembro 2023 – via Zoom

Horário: 13h00 – 15h00 (Lisboa – GMT+1)* | 9h00-11h00 (Brasília)

[Devido à mudança de fuso-horário na Europa, a partir de Novembro os encontros acontecerão das 12h00 às 14h00. O horário no Brasil continuará o mesmo.]




A atividade é aberta e é necessário realizar inscrição. A periodicidade é semanal, às quintas-feiras, pela plataforma Zoom. Serão emitidos certificados de participação a partir de 70% de frequência. Para o encerramento do ciclo, será realizado um colóquio.



O problema da diferença específica é uma discussão que percorre a história do pensamento. No Ocidente, durante a Idade Antiga, Média e Moderna, a alma e a razão foram os critérios escolhidos para fundamentar e garantir a distinção entre homens e animais (e também, já entre homens e crianças, homens e mulheres, homens e escravos). Esse debate, longe de ter acontecido em via unilateral de concordância, foi composto por variadas interpretações que forneceram estofo para heterogeneas cosmologias. No entanto, contextualizações políticas e religiosas ajudaram a eleger uma em detrimento de outras, sendo a ascensão do cristianismo um fator decisivo para amplificar as teorias filosóficas que melhor se encaixassem na mitologia bíblica e sua sustentação da excepcionalidade humana. Ao longo do tempo, devido à indissociação da alma e da razão, duas saídas tiveram grande destaque e influência na cultura: uma, a de inventar modalidades diferentes de almas, e, portanto, de capacidades cognitivas, onde os animais eram reconhecidos como seres dotados de almas inferiores, capazes de cognição, mas não de razão. Outra, de por fim, retirar qualquer traço de alma e cognição deles.

A despeito de na contemporaneidade o postulado da alma não ser mais o dispositivo orientador da distinção antropológica e de inferiorização dos animais outros que humanos, a alma, ou a ausência dela, é o que pulsa como origem e herança para outros conceitos relativos à interioridade que assumiram o seu lugar: mundo, linguagem, mente, inconsciente, etc. Jacques Derrida deixa como indicação de futuro por vir a necessidade de investigarmos as construções que forjaram o que foi chamado de “os próprios do homem”, para assim desconstruí-las e criarmos novas relações com os animais, não mais pautadas na condição de soberania e subalternidade. Donna Haraway fala da importância de aprender a não negar a heranças, mas sim contá-las, para não as herdar. Em suma, as teorias de origem precisam ser faladas.

No 6º ciclo do Grupo de Leitura Filosofia Animal “Sobre a alma e razão nos animais: perspectivas históricas”, retomaremos essa problemática a partir de alguns textos da Antiguidade até o século XIX. Propondo uma investigação histórica, trabalharemos trechos escolhidos de Platão, Aristóteles, Porfírio, Plotino, Agostinho, Tomás de Aquino, Montaigne, Descartes, La Mettrie, Condillac, a fim de analisar os movimentos e desdobramentos das ideias sobre a alma e a razão nos animais, que alimenta a tradição humanista especista.

A bibliografia detalhada e os textos serão enviados por e-mail, uma semana antes do primeiro encontro.


Sobre o Grupo de Leitura Filosofia Animal

O Grupo de Leitura Filosofia Animal é um trabalho de parceria entre o Grupo de Pesquisa sobre Ética e Direitos dos Animais do Diversitas-FFLCH/USP e o Grupo Praxis do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa. Tem como objetivo reunir pessoas dispostas a, coletivamente, ler e discutir textos clássicos e contemporâneos que se dediquem à análise das complexas relações entre humanos e outros animais, abarcando também o tema da animalidade nos âmbitos da ontologia, da política, da cultura, da ética e da atual crise ecológica, transitando por diferentes campos do conhecimento.

Realizamos um ciclo de leitura por semestre. Os encontros são semanais e, a depender do ciclo, sempre no período da manhã no horário do Brasil e no início da tarde no horário de Portugal. O primeiro ciclo foi dedicado a leitura do livro O animal que logo sou (a seguir), de Jacques Derrida. O segundo, foi dedicado ao tema “Devires-animais?” . O terceiro, a leituras de Donna Haraway; o quarto, a textos de Judith Butler e Emanuel Levinas sobre os conceitos de precariedade e alteridade, respectivamente; e o quinto, ao livro O que os animais nos ensinam sobre política, de Brian Massumi.

A cada finalização de ciclo são realizados eventos na forma de colóquios ou palestras com convidadas(os) externas(os), com o objetivo de melhor aprofundar os estudos e ampliar as discussões para além do trabalho realizado pelo grupo.


Grupo Praxis do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
Grupo de Pesquisa sobre Ética e Direitos dos Animais do Diversitas – FFLCH/USP (Núcleo de Estudos das Diversidades, Intolerâncias e Conflitos – Universidade de São Paulo)


Dirk Michael Hennrich – CFUL (Lisboa) / Diversitas (FFLCH/USP)
Luanda Francine Garcia da Costa – CFUL (Lisboa) / Diversitas (FFLCH/USP)

Pietro Gori


Questões da Metafísica e Prática de Ação em William James

17 October 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon



A palestra focar-se-á na obra Alguns problemas de filosofia de William James, publicada póstuma em 1911 e em que James liga numa visão unitária as reflexões desenvolvidas após a publicação dos Principles of Psychology. Colocando o Homem no centro da interrogação filosófica enquanto único verdadeiro princípio de significância do referido da experiência, James delineia uma concepção segundo a qual as questões de metafísica só podem ser colocadas no contexto duma filosofia da ação, para poderem ser relevantes. Isto é, o nível da praxis é que doa sentido ao trabalho teórico, para James, pois qualquer compromisso epistêmico reflete-se, de facto, nas escolhas que são feitas no nosso dia-a-dia. Consequentemente, o trabalho crítico da filosofia – orientada pragmaticamente, como é óbvio – torna-se extremamente importante, pois é justamente esse trabalho que, tocando nos alicerces da nossa mundividência, fundamenta uma prática de ação e até pode orientar as nossas vidas.