Higher-Order Metaphysical Resolutions of the Continuum Hypothesis

Peter Fritz (University College London)

7 March 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I aim to draw a connection between higher-order metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics, in particular set theory. Higher-order metaphysics means carrying out metaphysical debates in higher-order logic, using higher-order quantifiers to regiment talk of propositions, properties, and relations. A prominent topic in this area is grain science, the investigation of individuation conditions of propositions, properties, and relations. These topics seem purely metaphysical. But I will argue that they are intimately connected to questions in (the philosophy of) mathematics. In particular, I will argue that views about grain science can resolve the continuum hypothesis. To do so, I will present an example of such a view. I won’t argue for it, but I hope to motivate, first, that the view is attractive, or at least not implausible; second, that the view doesn’t obviously prejudge controversial questions in (the philosophy of) set theory; and third, that the view nevertheless settles the continuum hypothesis. The view assumes that sets obey the principles of ZFC set theory, and that propositions form a structure which corresponds to a particular complete Boolean algebra. Adapting standard forcing results using Boolean-valued models, we can show that this higher-order metaphysical view entails the failure of the continuum hypothesis.

Healthism, Neurodiversity, and Respectability Politics

Quill Kukla (Georgetown University)

28 February 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: “Healthism” is the pervasive ideology according to which each of us is responsible for valuing and protecting our own health and prioritizing health over other values, while society has the right to enforce, surveil, and reward healthy living. Neurodiversity and other forms of cognitive difference are generally understood through the lens of health: they are taken as diagnosable pathological conditions that should be treated or mitigated via medical interventions. Putting these two ideas together, neurodivergent people are supposed to try to be “healthy,” through pharmaceuticals, behavioral therapy, and the like, and society has an investment in making them be “healthy.” But neurodivergence is not a morbidity in a typical sense, so it is unclear what “health” means in this context. In practice, our societal standards for health for neurodivergent people are defined in terms of what avoids disrupting neurotypical expectations and systems or making neurotypical people uncomfortable. “Health,” for neurodivergent people, is in effect respectability—it is not defined in terms of their own needs or flourishing but in relation to the norms and needs of others. This can be seen from a close reading of diagnostic definitions and official medical “treatment” methods and goals. Trying to “treat” neurodivergent people by making them respectable citizens who are palatable within neurotypical productivity culture is usually likely to backfire; typically bad for their own well-being, and a social loss.

Nuno Ribeiro

NOVA University of Lisbon

Pluralismo Filosófico e Drama Heteronímico em Fernando Pessoa

25 February 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

A apresentação visa explorar as relações entre a constituição de um drama heteronímico e a criação de uma filosofia da pluralidade na obra de Fernando Pessoa, tendo por base a análise dos escritos filosóficos do espólio pessoano. Para esse efeito, dividirei a apresentação em duas partes: numa primeira, analisarei a relação entre o processo de dramatização e a constituição de um esboço de filosofia plural no período pré-heteronímico; numa segunda, explicitarei as relações entre o conceito de “drama em gente” e a construção de uma filosofia pluralista no período heteronímico.

How Do You Know That?

Giada Fratantonio (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

21 February 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: When someone asserts something, we sometimes respond by asking how they know, or what evidence they have, for their assertion. This is often a perfectly legitimate response, both in everyday life and in more formal settings. And yet, in some cases there is something uncomfortable about responding to the testimony of victims of trauma or discrimination with questions of this sort. One might think that this discomfort arises because asking these questions violates norms of privacy, politeness, or morality. This encourages the idea that we can and perhaps should ask these questions anyway in cases where our main concerns are epistemic. However, in this paper I argue that there are a broad range of cases where these questions are epistemically impermissible.

Ankica Čakardić

University of Zagreb

Family Abolition and Dead Labour: Hegel and Marxist-Feminism

18 February 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

The Croatian philosopher and Marxist-humanist associated with the Yugoslav Praxis School, Blaženka Despot, wrote in one of her essays: “With Hegel’s philosophy, with his intervention on freedom, he becomes a necessary starting point for the foundation of a certain Marxist-feminism”. In this lecture, I will attempt to develop a Marxist-feminist reading of Hegel through the lens of social reproduction theory by tracing some of Despot’s Marxist-feminist ideas. Social Reproduction Theory (SRT) is all about life-making. Its core tenet is the fact that the accumulation of surplus value under capitalism is not possible without informal, dead and unpaid domestic labour that generates healthy labour power. SRT traces the “hidden” processes that enable production possible, looks closely “behind the scenes”, at family relations and marriage, and attempts to examine the phenomena of life-making and the produced gender reality. In Hegelian sense, it focuses on Ethical life in its totality, taking into account both the capitalist system of needs and the state as well as the backstage of these visible social relations, i.e. the nuclear family. In Hegel’s writings we are confronted not only simply and naturally with the problem of the family and patriarchy, but also with the presentation of the fact that they constitute the very basis of the reproduction of capitalist society. In order to solve this Hegelian problem in Marxist-feminist terms and to stake out the terrain for the actualised freedom and emancipation of women, we must tackle this goal in its totality, on the long term. In this context, the anti-capitalist solutions include not only the abolition of private property, but also the abolition of the monogamous nuclear family.

Julie Saada

Sciences Po Paris

Human Rights, Freedom, and Socioeconomic Rights

11 February 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

I will analyze human rights from both historical and normative perspectives, focusing on three dialectical movements that characterize them. I will emphasize the interdependence of civil-political and socio-economic rights. The dialectic of the original productivity of human rights refers to the historical and intellectual movement that culminated in the French Revolution’s Rights of Man and of the Citizen. While individual rights were proclaimed as opposable to the sovereign, it was also through the absolutization of the sovereign’s authority that collective medieval legal forms were dissolved in favor of the individualization of rights. Subjective rights were thus constituted by a transformation of the legal subject, whose rights became opposable to power, and by a transformation of power, which granted rights to subjects. This movement led to what I term a ‘right to life beyond life,’ meaning a life transcending mere biological existence as it embodies the equal freedom of legal subjects. The right to life beyond life thus denotes the right to a particular political condition. However, this initial dialectic gives rise to two contradictions: Firstly, freedom is conceptualized as negative and individualistic, while the Declaration formulates economic and social rights that have been extensively developed in international Declarations and Conventions on human rights. Conceived as a right to a particular social condition, these rights focus on the material conditions necessary to realize freedom, emphasizing a collective dimension that presupposes social redistribution and solidarity mechanisms that states must ensure. This contradiction produces what I term a dialectic of the continuous production of human rights. Overcoming the contradiction between the two forms of freedom and the types of rights that constitute them can be achieved by establishing an interdependent relationship between rights. As expressed in civil and political rights, individual freedom can only be realized by promoting collective forms of freedom and rights. Thus, the right to life beyond life becomes not only a right to a particular political condition but also a right to a specific social condition, understood as a means of attaining freedom. Secondly, even when rights to a social condition are acknowledged, human rights remain abstract. Their general and indeterminate formulation is a prerequisite for their potential universalization. The contradiction lies in the fact that rights, which establish a right to life as a right to a specific political and social condition, are detached from what individuals and communities can actually do with them. They only become concrete rights when specified to particular agents in specific contexts, facilitated by specific implementation processes. Paradoxically, the universal formulation aims to render these rights locally interpretable and adaptable, creating a dialectic between the universal and the particular. The capabilities approach to human rights provides a means to verify that specific rights correspond to abstract rights and fulfill them, which is an essential condition of human dignity.

Fabrizio Boscaglia

Universidade Lusófona/CFUL

Fernando Pessoa e a Filosofia Islâmica: Questões de Receção, Representação e Interpretação

4 February 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+0)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Nesta sessão, são abordados aspetos do pensamento e da obra de Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935) relacionados com autores e questões da Filosofia e da Teologia Islâmicas. Ao considerar criticamente Pessoa enquanto poeta animado pela filosofia, e mais precisamente poeta e pensador, tal como ele se definiu em 1910 e 1933, esta abordagem baseia-se sobretudo (mas não só) no corpus de escritos filosóficos do autor. A partir da investigação no espólio e na biblioteca particular de Pessoa, tenta-se atender às seguintes questões: existem, na reflexão e na escrita filosófica de Pessoa, referências ao pensamento islâmico? Que autores e questões da filosofia islâmica foram abordados por Pessoa e de que forma? A partir de quais fontes, línguas e contextos culturais? Por que caminhos e para quais finalidades inerentes ao pensamento e à obra pessoana? Como ler estas referências no âmbito do pensamento filosófico contemporâneo em Portugal? Ao tentar responder, levantam-se uma série de questões específicas, relativas, tanto à receção do pensamento islâmico em Pessoa e na Europa, inclusivamente no que respeita à representação orientalista do mesmo, como inerentes à interpretação filosofante que Pessoa faz, em particular, das questões filosófico-religiosas de Deus, dos atributos divinos, do destino e do pluralismo religioso, entre outras.

An Uncertainty Model of Suicidality

Sidney Carls-Diamante (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

20 December 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Uncertainty is a factor widely but implicitly acknowledged to contribute to suicidality, but is not often studied as a suicidogenic factor in its own right. This presentation details the role of uncertainty in generating suicidal thoughts and actions. It is proposed that suicidality is a set of cognitive and behavioural strategies for reducing uncertainty and its consequential disruptions to homeostasis, i.e., psychological and/or physiological stability. The presentation argues that there are three dimensions of uncertainty that specifically contribute to suicidality: uncertainty about 1) whether currently experienced adversity will continue into the future, 2) about whether present conditions will improve and 3) about when they will change. Persisting through life entails continued experience of such high-uncertainty states that may prove detrimental to homeostasis. In contrast, death is a high-certainty state, wherein distress, pain, or suffering – manifestations of disrupted homeostasis – are reliably predicted to end. Suicidal ideation thus emerges as a mental model that allows the agent to imagine death as a state wherein homeostasis is restored. When the agent’s distress becomes severe enough, escalation to suicidal action can occur as a behavioural strategy to precipitate restoration of homeostasis (in the form of an end to suffering) through death.

Lisbon Meetings on the Philosophy of Music

5 June 2025

School of Arts and Humanities

University of Lisbon

The Language, Mind and Cognition Group (LanCog), in collaboration with the multidisciplinary group Clepsydra (University of Lisbon), is pleased to announce the Lisbon Meetings on the Philosophy of Music, to be held on 5 June 2025 at the School of Arts and Humanities, University of Lisbon.

This one-day event will feature contributions from leading scholars in the field, and up to five selected presentations from emerging researchers. We invite submissions of extended abstracts on any topic related to the philosophy of music.

Confirmed Keynote Speakers

• Andrew Kania (Trinity University, San Antonio)

• Julian Dodd (University of Leeds)

• Nemésio G. C. Puy (Complutense University of Madrid)

Submission Guidelines

• Submissions should take the form of extended abstracts (maximum 1000 words).

• Abstracts must be submitted in English and prepared for anonymous review.

• In addition to the abstract, authors must include their name, institutional affiliation, and contact information in the body of the email accompanying the submission.

• Accepted abstracts will be allocated a 25-minute presentation slot, followed by discussion.

• Please submit your abstract in PDF format to the following email address: philmusic.lisbon@gmail.com.

Important Dates

• Submission Deadline: 1 March 2025

• Notification of Results: 1 April 2025

Participation Fees

• Registration Fee: 115€

Scientific Committee

• Federico Lauria (University of Lisbon)

• Matteo Ravasio (Peking University)

• Tiago Sousa (University of Minho)

• Vítor Guerreiro (University of Porto)

Organizing Committee

• Hugo Luzio (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

• Madalena Sobral (Clepsydra, University of Lisbon)

For further inquiries, please contact the organizing committee at philmusic.lisbon@gmail.com.

Scientific Realism Under Fire

Michele Pizzochero (University of Bath & Harvard University)

13 December 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Structural realism and entity realism are two widely discussed forms of scientific realism that seek to identify those claims within scientific theories that warrant ontological commitment. Broadly, structural realism holds that belief should be accorded to relations, while entity realism (especially in the version articulated by Ian Hacking) endorses belief in the entities susceptible to manipulation. Both views assert that these claims—relations or entities—underlie the empirical success of science and persist amidst theory change. In this talk, I will challenge both structural and entity realism using the historical case of phlogiston, a fire-like element posited by eighteenth-century chemists that was ultimately deemed non-existent. Despite its referential failure, the phlogiston theory was empirically successful, generating genuine predictions and unifying diverse phenomena. Drawing from this episode, I will develop a twofold argument. First, against structural realism, I will argue that the set of empirically successful relations identified within phlogiston theory was not retained in subsequent scientific theories. Second, against entity realism, I will argue that phlogiston, despite its non-existence, enjoyed manipulative success. Overall, these arguments cast doubt on the general applicability of structural and entity realism as reliable guides to track reality in the face of theory change.