Structural Essentialism as an Ontology of the Physical World
Tomasz Bigaj (University of Warsaw)
15 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: In this talk I will introduce and discuss a structural version of essentialism with respect to the identification of individual physical objects. The adopted approach will be fundamentally generalistic (qualitativistic): the only way to identify a given individual is by reference to its place in a qualitative relational structure designated as “essential”. I will extensively discuss the problem of the multiplicity of alternative identifications of objects in possible scenarios (modality de re) using a broadly Lewisian concept of a counterpart function. Particular emphasis will be put on the possibility of the existence of qualitatively indistinguishable counterpart functions which differ merely haecceitistically, and on the threat such possibility poses to the position of generalism.