Sjoerd van Tuinen

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Agamben’s modal metaphysics

21 October 2025, 17:15 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

Starting from an observation made by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, I draw the outline of what could be called a ‘continental modal metaphysics’. Agamben suggests that the difference between analytical and continental philosophy goes back to the unresolved tension between the logical notion of modality (the four modal categories of necessity, possibility, contingency, impossibility that quantify the reality of some quidditative thing) and the ontological concept of a mode that is itself real yet not like things, and that is more fundamental than the distinction between essence and existence. My argument consists of two steps. First, I discuss two problems in the dominant form of modal metaphysics, analytical modal logic and its Aristotelian antecedents: the problems of the indeterminacy of the possible and its exhaustion by the actual. Drawing on Agamben, I then develop a concept of mode of existence that revolves around difference rather than identity. I argue that we must modalize the relation itself between the possible and the real: what passes from potential to actual is not an essence mirroring existence according to varying degrees of perfection, but the modality or sense in which existence alters itself. Accordingly I argue that continental philosophy defends a sense of possibility that is, firstly, not separate from the real but strictly a part of it, and secondly, that is more rather than less than the actual.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa

Reading Group as part of the Praxis-CFUL activities

The Science of Logic is probably one of the fundamental texts for understanding the Hegelian thought. Indeed, the Logic represents the first sphere of Hegel’s encyclopedic system, and its comprehension is essential to grasp the structure of the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit.

After reading the first book in the previous cycle, in this reading group we propose a detailed reading of the second book of the Science of Logic, the Doctrine of Essence.

Working language: English

Format: Online

Organizers: Silvia Locatelli and Iñigo Baca

The reading group will be online. It will be held every two weeks, on Fridays 16h00-18h00 Lisbon Time (GMT+0)

To register and ask for the link, please send an email to locatelli.silvia.96 [at] gmail.com

We will use the following recommended edition:

Hegel, G.W.F. The Science of Logic. Trans. George Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Program

Session 1 | 3 October 2025

Section I: Essence as reflection within
Chapter 1. Shine (pp. 337-354)

Session 2 | 17 October 2025

Chapter 2. The essentialities or the determinations of reflection (pp. 354-386)

Session 3 | 31 October 2025

Chapter 3. Ground (pp. 386-418)

Session 4 | 14 November 2025

Section II: Appearance
Chapter 1. Concrete existence (pp. 418-437)

Session 5 | 28 November 2025

Chapter 2. Appearance (pp. 437-449)

Session 6 | 12 December 2025

Chapter 3. The essential relation (pp. 449-465)

Session 7 | 16 January 2026

Section III: Actuality
Chapter 1. The absolute (pp. 465-477)

Session 8 | 30 January 2026

Chapter 2. Actuality (pp. 477-489)

Session 9 | 13 February 2026

Chapter 3. The absolute relation (pp. 489-507)

Iracema Duley

ICS/Universidade de Lisboa

The Fetish in Translation: Reflections from Central Angola

14 October 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

This presentation investigates the relationship between translation and fetishism, fixation and instability. Proposing that the concept of fetishism be understood beyond its formulation within so-called Western intellectual production by authors such as Marx and Freud, it considers its insertion into the history of the iterations of the concept of “fetish”. In Central Angola, the chain of substitutions related to terms such as feitiço, fetiche, fetish, Fetisch, etc., was expanded through translations of feitiço into Umbundu by Christian missionaries during the colonial period. The essay explores how, despite the missionaries’ attempt to bifurcate and fix the translation of feitiço into a positive and a negative pole — with umbanda juxtaposed with “remedy” and owanga equated with “harmful spell” — such a distinction is constantly called into question in Umbundu. Thus, if translation contains the promise of fixation and equivalence, it cannot contain displacement, manifested in Umbundu through the dissemination of terms that designate “spells”: umbanda, owanga, and the proliferation of names that express the materialization of desire in this language.

This event is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UID/00310, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa

Argument Rodizio

27 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

The Argument Rodizio is a session in which each participant presents a short, desirably surprising, argument in 5-10 minutes, to be discussed in the following 5-10 minutes. The argument should be as clearly stated as possible and written on the board or displayed on the computer.
 

Here’s the lineup for this year’s session:

1. Jeremy Pober:”Either Mind-Brain Reduction is True, or Reduction Doesn’t Matter”
2. Quentin Ruyant: “We Need Quantum Physics to Understand Consciousness (and Conversely)”
3. Bruno Jacinto: “Numbers All the Way”
4. Arvid Båve: “A Simple Argument for S5”
5. Matheus Valente: “One Winner, Two Losers”
6. Carolina Flores: “The Paradox of Security”
7. Sanna Hirvonen: “The Hiddenness of Dishes, or Can We Ever Know What We Eat?”
8. Robert Michels: “Philosophy is Art”

From Spacetime in Physics to Space and Time in Human Experience

Thomas Sattig (University of Tübingen)

20 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The development of the physics of space and time is a story of alienation. Today we face a deep gap between the way humans experience space and time and the way space and time are understood in contemporary physics. In the world of human experience, space and time are very different: space organizes things in a static way, while time organizes things in a dynamic way. In the world of contemporary physics, however, space and time are very similar: space and time form aspects of a single spacetime that organizes all things in a static way. It is a significant task of contemporary philosophy to bridge the gap between the physics of spacetime and the human experience of space and time. This talk will describe the gap and outline a path of reconciliation.

The Problem of Expressive Action in Philosophical Action Theory

Luca Bellini (LMU Munich)

6 June 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: There is a wide range of expressive actions we do. We kick cars that refuse to start, we kiss and talk to pictures, we wreck damage to the belongings of someone who cheated on us, and many others along the same lines. The problem of expressive action is the problem of explaining why we do such bizarre things. According to the received view, these are just actions out of emotion. Instead, I argue they are much more like make-believe games. Having to firstly clarify what makes expressive actions expressive – i.e. what, if anything, they express –, I draw on a hitherto overlooked analogy with both children’s games (e.g. duelling with make-believe swords) and rituals (e.g. burning in effigy) to claim that expressive actions, too, prescribe what is fictionally the case. While furthering our understanding of the role that imagination plays in justifying our conduct, this talk sheds light on the nature of rational agency and the problem of action – the problem of explaining what makes something an action in the first place. In doing so, I aim to show that our standard model of action explanation, encapsulated in the slogan “beliefs and desires cause actions”, has finally run its course.

Ana Miranda Mora

Utrecht University

Rage against Violence: An Affective Conceptualization of Feminist Resistance

3 June 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

This paper explores the philosophical significance of rage as an affective force in practices of political resistance, challenging prevailing accounts that dismiss or marginalize the role of emotions in politics. Drawing on contemporary affect theory and feminist political philosophy, the paper situates rage not merely as a reaction to injustice but as a constitutive element in forming political subjectivity and collective action. By distinguishing rage from ressentiment and violence, I argue that rage can embody a form of political praxis against structural violence. Rather than viewing affect as irrational or apolitical, this conceptualization frames rage as a generative and intelligible response to the lived experience of domination. The paper thus contributes to ongoing debates on the role of emotions in political agency, offering a re-evaluation of resistance that foregrounds affective life as an embodied and affective response to systemic injustice.

Filipe Nobre Faria

NOVA University Lisbon

Liberalismo em Crise? Desafios Demográficos e o Declínio da Confiança Social

20 May 2025, 17h00 (Lisbon Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

Abstract

A comunicação examina dois desafios fundamentais enfrentados pelas sociedades liberais modernas: o declínio da natalidade e a erosão da confiança social. Estes problemas são analisados em função dos princípios centrais do liberalismo, como a liberdade individual e a igualdade. Embora estes princípios visem promover inovação e prosperidade, podem também enfraquecer os laços sociais e fomentar normas culturais que dificultam a coesão comunitária. No caso da natalidade, serão abordados fatores como a urbanização, a mudança de valores culturais e a valorização da autonomia individual, que reduzem o incentivo à formação de famílias e contribuem para o envelhecimento populacional. Quanto à confiança social, a comunicação explorará como a mobilidade populacional, a diversidade cultural e a fragmentação social enfraquecem os laços de confiança entre os cidadãos. Por fim, a apresentação analisará as causas destes problemas ao nível dos valores que sustentam as sociedades liberais, os fatores que os reforçam e os possíveis cenários para a evolução destas sociedades.

Grasping Models as Epistemic Tools: From Scientific Representation to Engineering Design

Michael Poznic (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)

16 May 2025, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Models can be used for different kinds of projects in scientific or engineering contexts. Representational uses haven been predominantly discussed in philosophy of science. Next to such uses, the perspective on models as designs is equally important. What is common to most if not all target-directed modeling projects is that grasping the models is a first step to use the respective models for understanding their target phenomena. This talk sketches an account of grasping models that is primarily tailored to approaches that focus on objectual understanding. A central element is the evaluation of the models in terms of their direction-of-fit to their targets. Whether other epistemic achievements can be spelled out with such an account of grasping is something that the proposal does not preclude. An open question is the relevance for exploratory or other uses of models that are not directed at representing or designing targets.