Reading Group as part of the Praxis-CFUL activities

 

Working language: English

Organizer: Dr. Ricardo Mendoza-Canales (rcanales [at] letras.ulisboa.pt)

Where: Room B112.E (Library Building)

When: Thursdays, from 14h00 to 16h00 (according to the calendar below)

To participate, please send an e-mail to the convenor expressing your interest in taking part in the RG.

 

 

For decades, Gilbert Simondon was just a name mentioned in a handful of footnotes in influential books by Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard or Herbert Marcuse. Although he belonged to the same generation of first-line French philosophers such as Deleuze, Foucault, or Derrida, Simondon remained almost unknown, far from fame and recognition. He soon gained a reputation as a philosopher of technology with the publication of his first and best-known work, Du mode d’existence des objects techniques (1958), which corresponds to his secondary doctoral dissertation defended that same year; but since it wasn’t a hot topic at the time, his work remained merely as a distant reference, only accessible in the French-speaking milieu. This, together with the vicissitudes of the publication of his main doctoral dissertation, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et information (split and published in two separate parts with a gap of more than thirty years between them), and the fact that Simondon’s intellectual interests were not part of the mainstream philosophies of his time and thus moved in a different direction from those of his contemporaries, confabulated against him to remain confined to a restricted field of research, so that his philosophical project, until very recently, could never be appreciated in its radical unity, consistency, breadth and depth.

Nowadays, the sustained publication of his unpublished works (accompanied by an important rhythm of translations into the most widely used philosophical languages) has made available to scholars a wider scope of his entire philosophical project, which, in a nutshell, consists in reassessing the relationship between nature and culture, describing it as process in which life and being are part of a one single operation of becoming. This ambitious task demands a profound reformulation of every philosophical field concerned with this relationship: metaphysics, theory of knowledge, ethics, aesthetics, philosophical anthropology. By restoring the centrality that the paradigm of technique plays in shaping all human interaction with the world, Simondon rejects the primacy of substantialism and the hylomorphic scheme (matter-form interaction) as the bedrock of the classical Western metaphysics. Conversely, he pleas for a theory of individuation in terms of information, in which being is in a continuous process of becoming through operations of structuring and amplification.

 

The purpose of this reading group is to introduce and deepen our understanding of Simondon’s theory of individuation. To this end, we will close-read in its entirety his major work, Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information. The goals are: 1) to unravel together the dense web of concepts unfolded in this work (such as individuation, singularity, pre-individual, ontogenesis, operation, metastability, transduction, modulation, allagmatics, transindividuality, etc.); 2) to explore the ontological, ethical, political, and aesthetic consequences of thinking of individuation as a process that takes place in different regimes of reality (physical, biological, psychic, social); and 3) to grasp the significance of this philosophy of nature and a “genetic encyclopedism” that Simondon advocates, as well as its implications in our digital age and technological environment.

The English translation is strongly recommended as primary reading, as the sessions will be conducted in English:

Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information. Vol. 1. Taylor Adkins (trans.). Minneapolis-London: University of Minnesota Press, 2020.

 

Other editions/translations:

(Original French edition) L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et information. 2eme. ed. Paris: J. Millon, 2013.

(Spanish) La individuation a la luz de las nociones de forma e información. 2a. ed. Pablo Ires (trad.). Buenos Aires: Cactus, 2013.

(Portuguese) A individuação à luz das noções de forma e informação. Luís Eduardo Ponciano Aragon e Guilherme Ivo (trad.). São Paulo: Editora 34, 2020.

(Italian) L’individuazione alla luce delle nozioni di forma e di informazione. 2a. ed. Giovanni Carrozzini (trad.). Milano: Mimesis, 2020.

 

 

Program

 

Session 1 | 30 November 2023

Introduction (pp. 1-17)

 

Session 2 | 7 December 2023

Part I. Chap. 1. Form and Matter. I: “Foundations of the Hylomorphic Schema: Technology of Form-Taking” (pp. 21-36)

 

Session 3 | 14 December 2023

Part I. Chap. 1. Form and Matter. II: “Physical Signification of Technical Form-Taking” (pp. 37-47)

 

Session 4 | 18 January 2024

Part I. Chap. 1. Form and Matter. III: “The Two Aspects of Individuation” (pp. 47-54)

 

Session 5 | 25 January 2024

Part I. Chap. 2. Form and Energy (pp. 55-94)

 

Session 6 | 1 February 2024

Part I. Chap. 3. Form and Substance. I: “Continuous and Discontinuous” and II: “Particle and Energy” (pp. 95-125)

 

Session 7 | 8 February 2024

Part I. Chap. 3. III: “The Non-substantial Individual: Information and Compatibility” (pp. 126-164)

 

Session 8 | 15 February 2024

Part II. Chap. 1. Information and Ontogenesis: Vital Individuation. I: “Principles toward a Study of the Individuation of the Living

Being” (pp. 167-180)

 

Session 9 | 22 February 2024

Part II. Chap. 1. Information and Ontogenesis: Vital Individuation. II: “Specific Form and Living Substance” (pp. 180-208)

 

Session 10 | 29 February 2024

Part II. Chap. 1. Information and Ontogenesis: Vital Individuation. III: “Information and Vital Individuation” (pp. 208-225)

 

Session 11 | 7 March 2024

Part II. Chap. 1. Information and Ontogenesis: Vital Individuation. IVa: “Information and Ontogenesis” (pp. 225-244)

 

Session 12 | 14 March 2024

Part II. Chap. 1. Information and Ontogenesis: Vital Individuation. IVb: “Information and Ontogenesis” (pp. 244-256)

 

Session 13 | 21 March 2024

Part II. Chap. 2. Psychical Individuation. I: “Signification and the Individuation of Perceptive Units” (pp. 257-272)

 

Session 14 | 4 April 2024

Part II. Chap. 2. Psychical Individuation. II: “Individuation and Affectivity” (pp. 272-291)

 

Session 15 | 11 April 2024

Part II. Chap. 2. Psychical Individuation. IIIa: “Psychical Individuation and the Problematic of Ontogenesis” (pp. 291-308)

 

Session 16 | 18 April 2024

Part II. Chap. 2. Psychical Individuation.  IIIb: “Psychical Individuation and the Problematic of Ontogenesis” (pp. 308-326)

 

Session 17 | 2 May 2024

Part II. Chap. 3. Collective Individuation and the Foundations of the Transindividual. I: “The Individual and the Social, Group Individuation” (pp. 327-344)

 

Session 18 | 9 May 2024

Part II. Chap. 3. Collective Individuation and the Foundations of the Transindividual. II: “The Collective as Condition of Signification” (pp. 344-355)

 

Session 19 | 16 May 2024

Conclusion (pp. 356-380)

 

 

Tiago Carvalho

U Porto

Já Está Arranjado? Do Estatuto e Sentido da Reparação de Artefactos

24 October 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

 

Abstract

O título da minha comunicação baseia-se em larga medida no capítulo escrito para um livro ainda no prelo sobre manutenção e reparação de artefactos e infra-estruturas. A ideia ao longo da apresentação será explorarmos como a reparação de um artefacto levanta várias questões metafísicas e epistémicas. Será que reparar implica restaurar a função própria de um certo artefacto? E o que implica saber reparar um artefacto? Há alguma relação entre o saber científico e tecnológico necessário à construção de um artefacto e o saber necessário à respectiva reparação? Pode haver uma ciência da reparação? Para tentar responder a estas questões utilizarei conceitos da pós-fenomenologia e de teorias metafísicas da função de artefactos de forma a avançar com uma teoria geral da reparação que coloca a ênfase no sentido que um certo artefacto cumpre no mundo da vida dos seus utilizadores. Pretendo também estabelecer como a natureza do saber necessário à reparação é um saber prático, tácito e altamente contextualizado, mas precisamente por isso, um saber frágil e precário. A reparação é uma acção hermenêutica que abre a caixa negra do artefacto e põe em jogo a sua ambiguidade, i.e., e a forma como as intenções e as formas de vida dos utilizadores interagem com as intenções dos fautores dos artefactos. Essa ambiguidade é por sua vez posta em evidência através da forma como a transferência de artefactos entre diferentes culturas gera diferentes interpretações sobre a sua função.

Testimony and Expressive Behaviour

Matthew Parrott (University of Oxford)

 

20 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

 

Abstract: People often directly tell us about their thoughts, feelings, and desires. This common practice has led some philosophers to claim that testimony can be a fundamental way of knowing about others’ minds. In this talk, I shall argue that this claim is plausible only if we assume a certain conception of testimony, one which aligns it very closely with perception. By contrast, I shall argue that if we were to adopt a different conception of testimony, such as Richard Moran’s ‘assurance view’, then our acquiring testimonial knowledge of someone else’s mind would epistemically depend upon our having non-testimonial knowledge of their mental states. More specifically, I shall claim that this latter knowledge is based on a person’s expressive behaviours. Although one might naturally think this is either perceptual or inferential, in the final part of this talk, I develop an alternative framework for explaining how expressive behaviours ground our ordinary knowledge of others’ minds.

Pietro Gori

IFILNOVA

Questões da Metafísica e Prática de Ação em William James

17 October 2023, 16h00 (Lisbon Summer Time — GMT+1)

Sala Mattos Romão (Room C201.J – Department of Philosophy)

School of Arts and Humanities – University of Lisbon

 

Abstract

A palestra focar-se-á na obra Alguns problemas de filosofia de William James, publicada póstuma em 1911 e em que James liga numa visão unitária as reflexões desenvolvidas após a publicação dos Principles of Psychology. Colocando o Homem no centro da interrogação filosófica enquanto único verdadeiro princípio de significância do referido da experiência, James delineia uma concepção segundo a qual as questões de metafísica só podem ser colocadas no contexto duma filosofia da ação, para poderem ser relevantes. Isto é, o nível da praxis é que doa sentido ao trabalho teórico, para James, pois qualquer compromisso epistêmico reflete-se, de facto, nas escolhas que são feitas no nosso dia-a-dia. Consequentemente, o trabalho crítico da filosofia – orientada pragmaticamente, como é óbvio – torna-se extremamente importante, pois é justamente esse trabalho que, tocando nos alicerces da nossa mundividência, fundamenta uma prática de ação e até pode orientar as nossas vidas.

Can AI Help Humeans? The Laws of Nature Debate in Light of Automated Scientific Discovery

Robert Michels (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

 

13 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

 

Abstract: According to the standard Humean theory of the laws of nature, Lewis’s Best System Analysis, laws of nature have this status at least partly as the result of an optimal trade-off between scientific values such as simplicity and descriptive strength. This idea has recently come under pressure, since — as authors like Roberts and Woodward have pointed out — there might, pace what Humeans like to suggest, be no such trade-off in the way laws of nature are identified in the natural sciences. Recent developments in the field of automated scientific discovery, in particular regarding symbolic regression, promise to provide Humeans with an answer to this challenge and, as we will argue, might even allow them to in turn put pressure on rival theories of the laws of nature: Symbolic regression gives us a method for (re-)discovering laws which closely matches the Humean picture of what makes a law of nature a law of nature and in particular crucially involves a trade-off between simplicity and descriptive strength. In this paper, we discuss whether Humeans can indeed rely on symbolic regression to bolster their theory of laws of nature. (This is joint work with Niels Linnemann [University of Geneva].)

On Being in Two Places at Once

Gabriel Uzquiano (University of South California)

 

6 October 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

 

Abstract: We will discuss the question of whether a material object may be in two places at once. More precisely, the question is whether one and the same material object may have more than one exact location. This is not all that plausible when it comes to spatial location. Many dismiss the hypothesis that a material object may have more than one exact spatial location at a given time as plainly incoherent. However, the stakes are higher when it comes to temporal location. For one way to interpret the thesis that material objects endure through time is as the hypothesis that material objects are exactly located at every time at which they exist. The purpose of this talk is to argue for the coherence of multilocation.

Nota de pesar: O Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa manifesta o seu profundo pesar perante a morte do Professor Tomas Calvo Martinez, membro associado do CFUL, e associa-se ao luto e à dor sentida pela família e amigos mais próximos.

Deprivation and Historical Closeness: A Reply

Diogo Santos (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

 

29 September 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

 

Abstract: The aim of the paper is to address three recent objections made by Yi (2022) against our strategy of using what we’ve called “Historical Condition” in our analysis of what it is required to be deprived of some value due to a late birth or early death in Miguel & Santos (2020). Yi claims that the Historical Condition (i) is unduly restrictive, for according to it many cases that deprivationists believe are deprivations due to early deaths aren’t; (ii) it makes a problematic prediction, since even our preferred example doesn’t appear to count as a deprivation of value due to a late birth and (iii) it’s theoretically untenable, since it implies a problematic principle. In the paper I show that these objections are misguided for they appear to rely on a misinterpretation of the Historical Condition and the dialectical role it plays in the discussion.

The LanCog group at the University of Lisbon and the Philosophy of Physics group at Warsaw University of Technology are happy to announce the launch of the online Lisbon-Warsaw reading group in the philosophy of physics.

 

The reading group will meet on Zoom monthly to discuss newly published papers or work-in-progress drafts on timely and relevant topics. The meetings will consist of an extended Q&A session with the authors. The goal is to provide the participants with an occasion to actively engage with state-of-the-art research in the philosophy and foundations of physics.

 

In the first meeting, Flavio del Santo (University of Geneva) will join us to discuss his paper “Potentiality realism: A realistic and indeterministic physics based on propensities.” The meeting will be on 11 October (17:00-19:00 CEST).

 

To participate and receive a copy of the paper, please register here.

 

You can address any query to Antonio Vassallo (antonio.vassallo@pw.edu.pl)

 

The organizers,

Andrea Oldofredi

Davide Romano

Antonio Vassallo

Sceptical, Complacent, Critical: How Should the Conceptual Engineer Engage with Concepts?

Delia Belleri (LanCog, Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon)

 

15 September 2023, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

 

Abstract: Conceptual engineering is a method dealing with the assessment and revision of conceptual representations. It operates on the assumption that concepts are often defective and in need of improvement. This assumption can, however, lead to a form of “representational scepticism”. Scepticism is, in turn, depicted by some theorists as if it was the only alternative to uncritical acceptance of our conceptual representations (“representational complacency”). In this talk, I argue that it is not. The conceptual engineer can hold a form of “critical conservatism” about concepts. Critical conservatism emphasizes context-sensitivity, sensitivity to a variety of epistemic and non-epistemic considerations, as well as the exercise of skills that help the thinker evaluate conceptual flaws that can and cannot be tolerated. As such, is it a more nuanced position than representational scepticism, which, however, is still compatible with the conceptual engineer’s expected special sensitivity to conceptual flaws (and ways to fix them).