Diogo Santos<\/p>\n
LANCOG, University of Lisbon<\/p>\n
22 March 2019, 16:00<\/strong><\/p>\n Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa<\/strong><\/p>\n Sala Mattos Rom\u00e3o <\/strong>(Departamento de Filosofia)<\/p>\n Abstract:<\/strong> According to Dummett (1978) to understand the point of truth is to understand the normative role it plays in the governing of our asserting practices. Dummett\u2019s approach has influenced Assessment-sensitivity views (AS) (e.g. Egan, 2007; MacFarlane, 2011, 2014). AS holds that truth and, hence, the correctness of making and withdrawing assertions is assessment-sensitive. What practically distinguishes this theory from its rivals is its claim about the normative role of truth in the withdrawal of assertions. According to the view, an agent in C2 is obliged to retract an (unretracted) assertion that p<\/em> made in context C1 if p<\/em> is not true as originally used (in C1) and assessed from C2. Crucially, the retraction rule renders that an agent is sometimes obliged to retract an assertion that was correct for her to make.\u00a0Recent experimental data (Dinges & Zakkou, Fintel & Gillies, Kneer, Knobe & Yalcin, Marques) on discourse about personal taste and epistemic modals show that AS\u2019s retraction predictions are in conflict with ordinary speakers\u2019 intuitions. This greatly undermines the purported empirical support for AS. The experimental findings indicate that there is no empirical support for a retraction rule for assertions and that retraction and truth come apart. In this paper I diagnose why AS\u2019s predictions conflict with the empirical data and explain what is wrong with the theory\u2019s depiction of the normative role of truth in the withdrawal of assertions. The diagnosis importantly relies on the claim that retraction is not the only exercitive that agents may use to withdraw the assertoric commitments undertaken by the original assertion \u2013 something that those involved in the debate have overlooked.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Diogo Santos LANCOG, University of Lisbon Amending Assessment-Sensitivity 22 March 2019, 16:00 Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa Sala Mattos Rom\u00e3o (Departamento de Filosofia) Abstract: According to Dummett (1978) to understand the point of truth is to understand the normative role it plays in the governing of our asserting practices. Dummett\u2019s approach has influenced Assessment-sensitivity views […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"activitypub_content_warning":"","activitypub_content_visibility":"","activitypub_max_image_attachments":4,"activitypub_interaction_policy_quote":"","activitypub_status":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-702","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/702","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=702"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/702\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=702"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=702"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=702"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}