{"id":662,"date":"2018-10-23T03:02:05","date_gmt":"2018-10-23T02:02:05","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/seminar-series-in-analytic-philosophy-49\/"},"modified":"2018-10-23T03:02:28","modified_gmt":"2018-10-23T02:02:28","slug":"seminar-series-in-analytic-philosophy-49","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/seminar-series-in-analytic-philosophy-49\/","title":{"rendered":"Seminar Series in Analytic Philosophy"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Javier Gonzalez de Prado Salas<\/p>\n<p>IFILNOVA &amp; UNED<\/p>\n<h6><strong><em>How to Doubt Yourself Rationally<\/em><\/strong><\/h6>\n<p><strong>26 October 2018, 16:00<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Sala Mattos Rom\u00e3o <\/strong>(Departamento de Filosofia)<\/p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:<\/strong> Higher-order evidence can make an agent rationally doubt the reliability of her reasoning. When this happens, it seems that the agent should adopt a cautious attitude towards her original conclusion. This is so even if the higher-order evidence is misleading and the original reasoning was actually impeccable (say, it was a good piece of deductive reasoning). On the face of it, this is puzzling.\u00a0Why should the agent refrain from endorsing her initial conclusion, if her original reasons to endorse it remain as strong as before?\u00a0My proposal is that the (misleading) higher-order evidence undermines the agent\u2019s possession of her original first-order reasons, constituting what I call a <em>dispossessing defeater<\/em>. After acquiring the higher-order evidence, the agent is not anymore in a position to rely competently on the relevant first-order considerations as reasons for her original conclusion. In this way, such considerations stop being available to the agent as reasons for the conclusion. So, an agent with misleading higher-order evidence can adopt a cautious attitude while properly responding to the set of reasons that she possesses \u2013 a set that is reduced due to the acquisition of higher-order dispossessing defeaters.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Javier Gonzalez de Prado Salas IFILNOVA &amp; UNED How to Doubt Yourself Rationally 26 October 2018, 16:00 Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa Sala Mattos Rom\u00e3o (Departamento de Filosofia) Abstract: Higher-order evidence can make an agent rationally doubt the reliability of her reasoning. When this happens, it seems that the agent should adopt a cautious attitude [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"activitypub_content_warning":"","activitypub_content_visibility":"","activitypub_max_image_attachments":4,"activitypub_interaction_policy_quote":"","activitypub_status":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-662","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/662","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=662"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/662\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=662"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=662"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cful.letras.ulisboa.pt\/lancog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=662"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}