

SEMINÁRIO DE FILOSOFIA ANALÍTICA

Mestrado em Filosofia da Linguagem e da Consciência
(Departamento de Filosofia, FLUL)



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Why Continental Philosophy is Foolish – The Examples of Heidegger and Derrida: 23 de Outubro, 11h, Sala 5.2, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa.

Continental philosophy is a perfect example of cognitive folly - that is the thesis I propose to defend. Foolishness, it will be suggested, is indifference or worse with respect to cognitive values and norms. I explain what Continental Philosophy is, distinguishing it from philosophy on the continent, and sketching the history of one important strand within Continental Philosophy, which stretches from Brentano and Husserl, through Scheler and the other realist phenomenologists to Heidegger, Sartre and Derrida. I consider in detail Heidegger on truth and the structures of Derrida's deconstructions of philosophical oppositions and show that in each case we have examples of cognitive foolishness. Finally, I consider one objection to the foregoing, that it presupposes that philosophy is a theoretical enterprise.

Truth Making Not Mysterious: 24 de Outubro, 11h, Sala 5.2, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa.

The very idea that truth bearers are made true by entities is popular amongst only a minority of philosophers although it enjoyed a certain vogue in the work of Cambridge philosophers such as Stout, Russell, McTaggart, Wittgenstein, Broad, of phenomenologists such as Pfänder and more recently in the work of J. Austin. In order to make truth maker theory plausible, the very idea that there is a relation of truth making has to be defended and then, against currently popular nihilist, minimalist and deflationist views, a connection between the truth maker relation and the truth predicate has to be made out. I address the first task by exploring the relation between *making true*, *making probable*, and *making necessary* and argue that these instantiations of *x makes y F* are all to be understood in the same non-causal way. The relation of truth making is no more mysterious than that of making probable or making necessary. By means of a contrast between the causal and non-causal senses of the idiom I argue that the truth maker relation should not be understood simply as a necessitation relation. I then consider various ways in which truth might be said to consist in the possession of a truth maker.

Entrada Livre