Physicalist, Reductive Definitions of Concepts

Arvid Båve (LanCog, University of Lisbon)

29 November 2024, 16:00 (Lisbon Time – WET)

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão [C201.J] (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: I have previously argued that Bealer’s argument against reductive functionalism does not affect a version of the latter which incorporates a functionalist (or conceptual role) view of contents. That response raises questions about the nature of contents, however. Reductive functionalists clearly cannot take them to be physical, on grounds of multiple realizability. It seems the only option is therefore for them to take contents to be “second-order” entities, i.e., merely token-identical with physical entities but, type-wise, definable in physical terms in some way analogous to the way ordinary mental states are. The big question is then how such definitions might read. To explain how, I first make some assumptions about the nature of contents (propositions and their constituents, which I take to be concepts). They have been defended and discussed in detail in other work. On the basis of these assumptions, reductive definitions of concepts (including propositions) are proposed. A potential problem arises but I argue that there are many satisfying responses to it.