Research group: LanCog
Elia Zardini completed his undergraduate studies in philosophy, mathematics and history at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice and the Technical University of Berlin. He obtained his PhD in philosophy from the University of St Andrews in 2008. Since then he has held positions at the University of St Andrews, the University of Aberdeen, the National Autonomous University of Mexico, the University of Barcelona and the University of Lisbon. He is currently a Ramón y Cajal Researcher at the Complutense University of Madrid, Chief Research Fellow at the Higher School of Economics and Chief Editor of Disputatio. At present he works mainly on the application to questions of metaphysics of the conceptual tools and techniques he initially developed in his solutions to the paradoxes of vagueness and self-reference. In addition to this approach, he also pursues other lines of research in epistemology (immediate justification, transparency of knowledge and other states, the logic of knowability, know-how), philosophy of logic (nature and properties of logical consequence) and philosophy of language (reference, context, conditionals).
‘Paradox and Substructurality’, forthcoming in E. Brendel, M. Carrara, F. Ferrari, O. Hjortland, G. Sagi, G. Sher, F. Steinberger (eds), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
‘Verdict Exclusion, Higher-Order Vagueness, Cross-Order Vagueness and Borderlineness. Reflections on Footnote 41 of Crispin Wright’s ‘On Being in a Quandary’ ’, forthcoming in M. Petrolo, G. Venturi (eds), Paradoxes between Truth and Proof, Springer, Dordrecht.
‘Neoclassical Logic, Cloisonnist Vagueness, Nonobjectual Truth’, forthcoming in S. Leuenberger, A. Rieger (eds), Themes from Alan Weir, Springer, Dordrecht.
‘Seconde naïveté’, forthcoming in A. Abasnezhad, O. Bueno (eds), On the Sorites Paradox, Springer, Dordrecht.
‘The Underdetermination of the Meaning of Logical Words by Rules of Inference’, forthcoming in E. Zardini & D. Dodd (eds.), The A Priori: Its Significance, Sources, and Extent, Oxford University Press, Oxford
2022, ‘The Final Cut’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 51, pp. 1583–1611.
2021, ‘Closed without Boundaries’, Synthese 199, pp. 641–679.
2021 (with S. Oms), ‘Inclosure and Intolerance’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 62, pp. 201–220.
2019, ‘Non-Transitivism and the Sorites Paradox’, in E. Zardini & S. Oms (eds.), The Sorites Paradox, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 168–186.
2019, ‘Instability and Contraction. Méditations hégéliennes I’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 48, pp. 155–188.
2018, ‘Generalised Tarski’s Thesis Hits Substructure’, in N. Kellen, N. Pedersen, J. Wyatt (eds), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 237–276.
2018, ‘The Role of Utterances in Bradwardine’s Theory of Truth’, Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 85, pp. 155–193.
2017, ‘Further Reflections on Sentences Saying of Themselves Strange Things’, Logic and Logical Philosophy 26, pp. 563–581.
2017, ‘K * E’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94, pp. 540–557.
2016, ‘No State A Priori Known to Be Factive Is Mental’, Philosophical Issues 26, pp. 462–492.
2016, ‘Restriction by Non-Contraction’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 57, pp. 287–327.
2015, ‘Breaking the Chains. Following-from and Transitivity’, in C. Caret, O. Hjortland (eds), Foundations of Logical Consequence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 221–275.
2015, ‘Getting One for Two, or the Contractors’ Bad Deal. Towards a Unified Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes’, in T. Achourioti, K. Fujimoto, H. Galinon,
J. Martínez (eds), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 461–493.
2015, ‘The Opacity of Truth’, Topoi 34, pp. 37–54.
2015, ‘Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge: A Classical Solution to the Paradox of Knowability’, Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30, pp. 365–392.
2015, ‘A and omega’, in A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers: Themes in Logic, Metaphysics, and Language, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 489–526.
2014, ‘Confirming the Less Likely, Discovering the Unknown. Dogmatisms—Surd and Doubly Surd, Natural, Flat and Doubly Flat’, in D. Dodd, E. Zardini (eds), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 33–70.
2014, ‘Context and Consequence. An Intercontextual Substructural Logic’, Synthese 191, pp. 3473–3500.
2014, ‘Evans Tolerated’, in A. Abasnezhad, K. Akiba (eds), Vague Objects and Vague Identity, Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 327–352.
2014, ‘Naive Truth and Naive Logical Properties’, The Review of Symbolic Logic 7, pp. 351–384.
2014, ‘Possibility, Necessity and Probability. A Meditation on Underdetermination and Justification’, Erkenntnis 79, pp. 639–667.
2014, ‘The General Missing from the Hierarchy’, in F. Bacchini, S. Caputo, M. Dell’Utri (eds), New Frontiers in Truth, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, pp. 176–200.