HPhil Seminar: April 24, 2025.

The HPhil (History of Philosophy) Research Group of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon announces the 2024/25 edition of its permanent seminar on the history of philosophy, devoted to the presentation of conferences by renowned specialists while also creating opportunities to emerging scholars, aiming to promote advanced studies in groundbreaking debates and the permanent training of its academic community.

In this session of the seminar, Raffaella Antonini (CFUL)  will present a paper, entitled “A Reading of Plato’s Charmides – Temperance as the Science of Science and the Appeal to the δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτὸ”. (abstract below)

The session will take place on April 24, 2025 at 5 p.m., in the Room C201.J (Room Mattos Romão, Department of Philosophy). Admission is free

Abstract

The Charmides, one of Plato’s early dialogues, centres on an inquiry into the nature of σωφροσύνη (temperance), featuring Socrates in conversation with the young Charmides and his guardian Critias. The conversation is initially prompted by Charmides’ striking beauty, which leads Socrates to question whether such external grace is matched by an inner temperance of soul.

This paper focuses on the dialogue’s third and most provocative definition of temperance: first as self-knowledge, in accordance with the Delphic maxim ‘know thyself’, then radically reconceived as ‘the science of itself and of all other sciences’. Modern interpreters have often read this as an early philosophical exploration of self-consciousness.

To unpack this epistemic claim, the dialogue introduces the concept of δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό—literally the capacity for self-relation. This notion establishes a crucial distinction between logical reflexivity and relativity: a property possesses δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό if and only if it permits self-attribution. This possibility hinges on the property’s οὐσία (essential nature)—specifically, whether it is intrinsically reflexive or constitutively relative. While reflexivity initially appears indispensable for understanding temperance as ‘the science of itself,’ the dialogue ultimately rejects this definition as logically untenable.

This paper advances a constructive interpretation of both temperance as ‘the science of science’, and the Charmides’ aporetic conclusion. By re-examining the δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό, I argue that the dialogue’s dismissal of reflexive knowledge, rather than undermining its epistemic value, in fact reveals deeper epistemological insights about the very possibility of self-knowledge.