JESSICA MOSS – Gulbenkian Lectures in the Humanities

February 13, 2025

Public lecture 1: Knowledge in Ancient Greek and Contemporary Philosophy – 13 Februray 5-7 PM ANF.III

Were Plato and Aristotle interested in knowledge, or instead in something deeper and more demanding, such as scientific understanding? I explain the problem, and then argue for a new answer. Plato and Aristotle’s epistêmê is indeed deeper and more demanding than what contemporary epistemologists take as their focus – non-accidentally true belief. But epistêmê and non-accidentally true belief are both best conceived of as species of the same genus, knowledge. This becomes clear when we follow Plato and Aristotle in understanding knowledge primarily in terms of “knowledge of things” – or as I prefer to put it, good acquaintance with reality. Epistêmê is good acquaintance with the most important aspects of reality, and that is why it is deep and demanding. As for non-accidentally true belief, this too is best conceived as good acquaintance with reality – specifically, with any kind of fact.

Public lecture 2: Belief in Ancient Greek and Contemporary Philosophy – 14 February 5-7 PM ANF. III

The Ancient Greek word ‘pistis’ begins as a word for trust in people or gods, and then takes a doxastic turn: in Plato it functions as a synonym for ‘doxa’ (opinion), and in Aristotle as a term for credence or conviction. We see something similar in English, and many other languages: ‘belief’ can refer to confidence/faith/trust (“I believe in you”) or the propositional attitude of taking-to-be-true. By tracing the history of pistis and its cognate verb and adjective, I show that in Greek at least this is not a change of meaning. ‘Pistis’ is univocal: it always means trust. In using the word for a doxastic attitude, Plato and Aristotle are developing an idea already long implied by the use of the verb and adjective. To trust a certain kind of entity – a claim, account, or story, or a thought or memory or visual appearance; in general, a representation with propositional content – is to take it to be true, i.e. to believe it. I conclude by arguing that this is an appealing theory of propositional belief.