Guido Imaguire

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

A Semantic Criterion for Existential Import

19 December 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Room B1

Abstract: In his book Logic and How It Gets That Way, Jacquette (2010) presents ‘the formalization paradox’ which emerges from the attempt to formalize a sentence like ‘Some monkey devours every craisin’, where craisins are imaginary non-existent fruits. From this paradox Jacquette concludes the expressive inadequacy of classical predicate quantificational logic. In this paper I analyze the three assumptions made in the emergence of the paradox, viz.: (i) colloquial expressions of the same logical form can and should be formally symbolized by applying the same symbolization schema; (ii) ‘Some monkey devours every raisin’ is correctly translated as ∃x (Mx ∧ ∀y (Ry ® Dxy)); (iii) uninstantiated predicates can legitimately enter into (meaningful, true or false) predicate-quantificational symbolizations. I fully accept (iii), but reject both (i) and (ii).  I argue, firstly, that (i) has at first glance two possible interpretations, one trivial and one false. So, I try to establish a third and more reasonable interpretation. Based on this interpretation I argue that ∃x (Mx ∧ ∀y (Ry ® Dxy)) is not the adequate formalization of ‘Some monkey devours every raisin’. My basic claim is based on a generalization of Russell’s theory of descriptions: just as most sentences of natural language which contain definite descriptions are viewed as entailing existential force which must be made explicit in formalization, so do we also consider many, although not all, sentences which contain general terms. A criterion will be presented and defended for deciding in each possible case if a sentence entails existential force.

Guido Imaguire

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

Is Ostrich Nominalism a Dismissive Solution
to the Problem of Universals?

15 December 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Ostrich Nominalism is often described as a dismissive solution to the problem of universals. This is curious because there is no agreement about what exactly is the core of this problem, and which is its adequate formulation. In this paper I will present five different formulations and argue that Ostrich Nominalism is not dismissive at all. In fact, I will propose a positive and substantial answer to each one of the formulations of the problem. However, in order to solve predicaments of the original formulation of Ostrich Nominalism it will be important to appeal to the notion of ontological grounding and its logic.

Luís Estevinha Rodrigues

Federal University of Ceará

Mixed Epistemology, Methodological Naturalism, Gettierization and Explanatory Blindness

24 November 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Henderson & Horgan (2011) defended a middle ground epistemology with three main ingredients: low-grade apriorism, transglobal reliabilism and objective epistemic justification. In this talk I evaluate the bulk of this proposal and raise some objections concerning the scope of its naturalized chunk.

Apresentação do livro “O Apocalipse segundo Fernando Pessoa e Ofélia Queiroz” de Paulo Borges, 21 de Novembro, 18:30

Com a presença do autor e recitação de textos por Ângela Santos, Daniela Velho e Maria Paula Lourinho

Local: O Coração do Mundo, Av. Duque de Ávila, 95, 3º andar (junto ao Metro Saldanha)

 

A obra é a base do guião do espectáculo multi-artístico com o mesmo nome que se estreou recentemente no Teatro do Bairro, em Lisboa, e terá uma nova representação no Teatro D. João V, na Damaia, em 25 de Novembro, às 21:30

“Sozinho, no cais deserto, nesta Hora sem tempo
Olho pro lado da barra, olho pro Infinito
Olho sem olhos, corpo-alma transido de saudade
Olho a fúria deste céu de crepúsculo e tempestade
E a Distância começa em mim a girar
A Distância começa em mim a girar
A Distância começa em mim a girar”

“Sou A-que-não-é, A-que-não-foi, A-que-jamais-será
A matriz imensa que a tudo dá à luz, nutre, reabsorve e recria
A mãe, irmã, esposa e amante de todos os seres e coisas
O Alfa-Ómega
A Toda-Poderosa que nada pode senão tudo amar
A infinita saudade que há em todas as coisas
O Infinito-Saudade”

“Não apareci senão para te iniciar ao Amor
Para te insuflar boca na boca o Fogo-Sopro do mundo
Para unirmos os corações ardentes
No íntimo da carne iluminada”

“Ah, quem me desencantará?
Quem me reconhecerá?
Quem me beijará o coração?
Quem me amará e fecundará?
Quem erguerá a mão, encontrará hera
E verá que “ele mesmo era
A Princesa que dormia”?”

“Cesse aqui todo o pensamento, imaginação e linguagem
Dissipem-se todos os véus de conceitos, palavras e símbolos
Finde tudo o que a musa antiga canta
Que outro valor mais alto se levanta
Nada acrescentemos ao espanto, perplexidade e maravilhamento
Deste imenso esplendor e prodígio!”

“Vinde a nós, ó vós todos em cujo íntimo desde sempre habitamos!
Vinde a nós, ó vós todos em cujo coração agora mesmo ressurgimos!
Vinde, ó vinde, vós todos que sois Todo o Mundo e Ninguém!
Ó vós todos, povos-seres de todo o cosmos que trazeis no coração um Mundo Novo!
Aqui e Agora vos convocamos
É a Hora da Grande Mutação
A Hora das Horas
A Hora dos quatro tempos refluírem para o centro anterior a tudo
E ressurgirem como o Quinto
O Império sem império
A Era sem tempo
A Era sem era do despertar da consciência-coração na visão-amor universal!

Ó excelsas irmandades e confrarias do Quinto Império sem império nem imperador a não ser a coroada criança que dança de roda e olhos atónitos num rodopio de espantos, pombas e rosas!
Ó excelsas irmandades e confrarias do Império do Santo Espírito, que ninguém sabe de onde vem nem para onde vai, sopra onde quer e fala um silêncio de todas as línguas!
Ó excelsas irmandades e confrarias dos amantes andróginos, que conduzem ao altar interno o masculino e o feminino e o unem em Núpcias mais vastas que o espaço que explodem em festas e folias de amor por todos os seres e coisas!

Vinde a nós, ó vós todos, que é a Hora!
É a Hora!
A Hora!
Agora!

Valete, Fratres!
Saúde, Irmãos!”

Entrada Livre

Filipe Martone

University of Campinas / FAPESP

Against Sentential and Propositional Priority in Metasemantics

17 November 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In virtue of what do our words have meaning? It is nearly a truism that words have meaning because they are connected with human actions: we endow them with significance in virtue of using them to engage with the world. Sentence Priority is the thesis that the fundamental language-world engagement occurs at the level of whole sentences. It follows that sentences, not words, are the fundamental bearers of meaning. The motivation behind Sentence Priority is what I call Propositional Priority, the idea that propositional speech acts (things like asserting and commanding) are the most fundamental linguistic actions out of which meaning emerges. In this talk I argue that those theses cannot be right. I show that, if we accept Propositional Priority, we must accept Sentence Priority. However, Sentence Priority leads to the indeterminacy of word meaning, and this makes it impossible to explain how unused sentences have the meanings that they do. In short, Propositional and Sentence Priority are incompatible with compositionality, or so I claim. I argue that there must be at least some fundamental language-world connections at the subsentential level that explain how word meaning can directly emerge. I conclude by sketching a broadly Russellian account.

Massimiliano Carrara

University of Padua

Denial: a Logic, a Paradox and a Dilemma

10 November 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: How glut-theorists may express disagreement with the assertion of A if Boolean negation cannot be expressed in their language? A glut-theorist’s answer is by denying or rejecting A: To make up for the lack of exclusive negation, a glut-theorist like Priest introduces the notion of denial or rejection of a sentence, understood as a speech act, as clearly distinguished from the acceptance of the negation of A. I argue that the proposal meets some difficulties: the reason is that if the exclusivity of negation is the key to solving the semantic paradoxes, the exclusivity of denial/rejection land us back in paradox. I sketch a bilateral logic of exclusive denial for glut theorists – an extension of the Logic of Paradox (LP) and I observe that exclusive deniability – a key semantic notion of the logic – is not expressible in a dialetheist’s language. I conclude that glut theorists are faced with a dilemma: either denial can serve as means to express disagreement, but the notion of exclusive deniability is not expressible in the glut theorist’s language, or deniability is expressible, but denial may no longer serve as a means to express disagreement.

Bogdan Dicher

LANCOG Universidade de Lisboa

The Original Sin of Proof-Theoretic Semantics
(joint work with Francesco Paoli)

3 November 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Logical inferentialists hold that the meaning of the logical constants is determined by the rules of inference which govern their behaviour in proofs. In the inferentialist tradition, one usually identifies the derivability relation of a logic with the logic’s (internal) consequence relation. This leads to departures from the orthodox Tarskian view according to which a consequence relation is reflexive, monotonic, and transitive. Our aim is to show that the inferentialist account of the meaning of the logical constants can keep very close to the Tarskian paradigm. Using the Blok-Jonsson theory of abstract consequence relations, we show how meanings can be seen to be determined inferentialistically within the bounds of a reflexive, monotonic and transitive consequence relation.

O Núcleo de Estudos Simmelianos da Universidade de Lisboa, associado ao grupo PRAXIS do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, pretende dar a conhecer e debater o pensamento do filósofo Georg Simmel através de sessões de estudo e conferências.

Estas sessões serão quinzenais, estando divididas em duas modalidades: uma de estudo e troca de ideias e outra em modo de seminário público ( onde serão convidados especialistas na área).

Para mais informações contactar: 
nestudossimmelianos@gmail.com
ou
maribel.sobreira@campus.ul.pt

NES_UL cartaz  - cópia