The latest issue has been released in November 2018!

Disputatio is the journal of LanCog, and is published by the prestigious publisher De Gruyter.

The journal is entirely Open Access.


You can access the journal webpages here and here.


The latest issue of Phainomenon is now available (entirely in Open Access)!


This issue on Philosophy and Psychopathology: phenomenological perspectives was organized by Elisabeta Basso and gathers several contributions resulting from a conference on the matter.


From the Editor’s Introduction:

«Over the last twenty years, we have been witnessing in the international context the emergence of what is presented as a “new research domain” within the philosophical field, the so – called “philosophy of psychiatry”. In order to define this new domain, the Anglo – American authors, in particular, go back to Karl Jaspers’ Allgemeine Psychopathologie and his attempt, at the beginning of the 20th century, to refound psychopathology on the basis of the phenomenological method. Indeed, according to this view, “philosophy of psychiatry” would come to exist together with an appeal to phenomenology, in order to provide psychiatry with a systematic method for investigating the psychopathological phenomena. Now, in fact, the perspectives labelling themselves as “phenomenological” in psychopathology are quite heterogeneous, and it is necessary to study them thoroughly, from both an epistemological and historical point of view, if we actually want to understand and benefit from them at present.».

Roberto Giuntini

University of Cagliari &

Centro Linceo Interdisciplinare Benaminio Segre

Yes, No, Perhaps: A Logical Introduction to Quantum Computation

22 February 2019, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Quantum computation has suggested new kinds of logic, which are deeply different both from Boolean logic (the logical background of classical computation) and from multi-valued (fuzzy) logics. The most striking feature of quantum computational logic is the introduction in the realm of pure logic of new and physically motivated connectives (gates) that have neither a classical nor a fuzzy-like analogue. In this talk, we will present some of these connectives (in particular, the square-root of negation and the square-root of the identity) and we will discuss some of their most funny and illogical properties.

A new issue of the journal Philosophica  (52, 2018) has been released! This issue was organized around the intersection of Philosophy and Medicine, focusing on pain and suffering, fitting in the recent and wider discussion of Medical Humanities.


From the editor’s introduction (in Portuguese):

Uma dificuldade inicial era determinar e explicar o “objecto” (de que falamos?) sem incorrer em mais um afrontoso enxame de palavras. Concluímos que para tal era preferível dar voz – na variedade das perspectivas  – a quem se dedica ou dedicou profissionalmente a tratar doentes com dores físicas e/ou morais inauditas. E convidar eticistas de origem e vivência filosófica para introduzir aspectos das problemáticas actuais e argumentos robustos e/ou cogentes sobre a dolência e a dor.



Previous issues can also be found here.

The Community/Parish of Campo de Ourique (Lisbon) and the publisher Edições Colibri are paying a tribute to Professor Fernando Belo, former Professor at Philosophy Department of the School of Arts and Humanities of the University of Lisbon and  Researcher at CFUL.

The event will be held on saturday, February 16th at 4 p.m at Biblioteca/Espaço Cultural Cinema Europa (Lisbon).

For more information about the event, please follow the link.

Célia Teixeira

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

Is There a Special Relationship Between
the A Priori and the Analytic?

21 December 2018, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The a priori and the analytic have traditionally enjoyed a very special relationship. This relationship may be characterized by two theses: (i) a priori knowledge is mere knowledge of analytic truths, and (ii) we can explain the a priori with the analytic. Both theses were close to orthodoxy during the first half of the twentieth century. In recent years, there has been renewed interest in analyticity, and both theses became, once more, widely held. My aim in this talk is to challenge this special relationship. I argue that even if (i) were true (ii) is false, and that we also have good reason to reject (i). I conclude by suggesting a new argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction.

David Yates

LANCOG University of Lisbon

Functionalism and Transparency: Chalmers on Spatial Concepts

23 November 2018, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In a recent paper (‘Three puzzles about spatial experience’), David Chalmers offers three twin-Earth cases designed to show that our ordinary, everyday spatial concepts do not reveal the essential natures of their referents, but refer to them as the normal causes of spatial phenomenology. Chalmers is thus a realizer functionalist about spatial concepts: they refer to their referents as the occupants of roles, where the roles in question are given in phenomenological terms. The non-transparency of spatial concepts is counterintuitive, since it seems that concepts such as sphericality and separation give us at least some epistemic access to the essential natures of the spatial properties they refer to. In this paper I first argue that phenomenal spatial functionalism is untenable. I then distinguish two variants of theoretical spatial functionalism, the view that everyday spatial concepts are defined by a folk physical theory. According to theoretical realizer functionalism, spatial concepts refer to whatever properties occupy the folk physical roles. According to theoretical role functionalism, spatial concepts refer to second-order properties that are individuated by their folk physical roles. On this latter theory, spatial concepts are (at least partially) transparent: spatial properties are conceived in terms of their places in the theoretical structure that individuates them, hence in terms of their essential natures. I argue that Chalmers’ twin-Earth cases are all consistent with theoretical role functionalism, and conclude that there is no compelling twin-Earth argument for the non-transparency of spatial concepts.

O CFUL manifesta o seu enorme pesar pelo falecimento do Professor Doutor Fernando Belo.

Filósofo, docente do Departamento de Filosofia da FLUL, entre 1975 e 2003, e investigador do Centro de Filosofia da ULisboa, o Professor Fernando Belo destaca-se pelo seu notável percurso académico, em particular no âmbito do estudo da Filosofia da Linguagem, e pelo seu enorme contributo para o diálogo entre a Filosofia e outros domínios científicos.


Anne Schwenkenbecher

Murdoch University

Shared Intentions, Loose Groups, and Pooled Knowledge

7 December 2018, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: We study shared intentions in what we call loose groups. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is a condition on what the group members know and believe about what the others intend, know, and believe. We propose an alternative, pooled knowledge, and argue that it allows formulating conditions on shared intentions that meet the two desiderata.