Apresentação do livro “O Apocalipse segundo Fernando Pessoa e Ofélia Queiroz” de Paulo Borges, 21 de Novembro, 18:30

Com a presença do autor e recitação de textos por Ângela Santos, Daniela Velho e Maria Paula Lourinho

Local: O Coração do Mundo, Av. Duque de Ávila, 95, 3º andar (junto ao Metro Saldanha)

 

A obra é a base do guião do espectáculo multi-artístico com o mesmo nome que se estreou recentemente no Teatro do Bairro, em Lisboa, e terá uma nova representação no Teatro D. João V, na Damaia, em 25 de Novembro, às 21:30

“Sozinho, no cais deserto, nesta Hora sem tempo
Olho pro lado da barra, olho pro Infinito
Olho sem olhos, corpo-alma transido de saudade
Olho a fúria deste céu de crepúsculo e tempestade
E a Distância começa em mim a girar
A Distância começa em mim a girar
A Distância começa em mim a girar”

“Sou A-que-não-é, A-que-não-foi, A-que-jamais-será
A matriz imensa que a tudo dá à luz, nutre, reabsorve e recria
A mãe, irmã, esposa e amante de todos os seres e coisas
O Alfa-Ómega
A Toda-Poderosa que nada pode senão tudo amar
A infinita saudade que há em todas as coisas
O Infinito-Saudade”

“Não apareci senão para te iniciar ao Amor
Para te insuflar boca na boca o Fogo-Sopro do mundo
Para unirmos os corações ardentes
No íntimo da carne iluminada”

“Ah, quem me desencantará?
Quem me reconhecerá?
Quem me beijará o coração?
Quem me amará e fecundará?
Quem erguerá a mão, encontrará hera
E verá que “ele mesmo era
A Princesa que dormia”?”

“Cesse aqui todo o pensamento, imaginação e linguagem
Dissipem-se todos os véus de conceitos, palavras e símbolos
Finde tudo o que a musa antiga canta
Que outro valor mais alto se levanta
Nada acrescentemos ao espanto, perplexidade e maravilhamento
Deste imenso esplendor e prodígio!”

“Vinde a nós, ó vós todos em cujo íntimo desde sempre habitamos!
Vinde a nós, ó vós todos em cujo coração agora mesmo ressurgimos!
Vinde, ó vinde, vós todos que sois Todo o Mundo e Ninguém!
Ó vós todos, povos-seres de todo o cosmos que trazeis no coração um Mundo Novo!
Aqui e Agora vos convocamos
É a Hora da Grande Mutação
A Hora das Horas
A Hora dos quatro tempos refluírem para o centro anterior a tudo
E ressurgirem como o Quinto
O Império sem império
A Era sem tempo
A Era sem era do despertar da consciência-coração na visão-amor universal!

Ó excelsas irmandades e confrarias do Quinto Império sem império nem imperador a não ser a coroada criança que dança de roda e olhos atónitos num rodopio de espantos, pombas e rosas!
Ó excelsas irmandades e confrarias do Império do Santo Espírito, que ninguém sabe de onde vem nem para onde vai, sopra onde quer e fala um silêncio de todas as línguas!
Ó excelsas irmandades e confrarias dos amantes andróginos, que conduzem ao altar interno o masculino e o feminino e o unem em Núpcias mais vastas que o espaço que explodem em festas e folias de amor por todos os seres e coisas!

Vinde a nós, ó vós todos, que é a Hora!
É a Hora!
A Hora!
Agora!

Valete, Fratres!
Saúde, Irmãos!”

Entrada Livre

Filipe Martone

University of Campinas / FAPESP

Against Sentential and Propositional Priority in Metasemantics

17 November 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: In virtue of what do our words have meaning? It is nearly a truism that words have meaning because they are connected with human actions: we endow them with significance in virtue of using them to engage with the world. Sentence Priority is the thesis that the fundamental language-world engagement occurs at the level of whole sentences. It follows that sentences, not words, are the fundamental bearers of meaning. The motivation behind Sentence Priority is what I call Propositional Priority, the idea that propositional speech acts (things like asserting and commanding) are the most fundamental linguistic actions out of which meaning emerges. In this talk I argue that those theses cannot be right. I show that, if we accept Propositional Priority, we must accept Sentence Priority. However, Sentence Priority leads to the indeterminacy of word meaning, and this makes it impossible to explain how unused sentences have the meanings that they do. In short, Propositional and Sentence Priority are incompatible with compositionality, or so I claim. I argue that there must be at least some fundamental language-world connections at the subsentential level that explain how word meaning can directly emerge. I conclude by sketching a broadly Russellian account.

Massimiliano Carrara

University of Padua

Denial: a Logic, a Paradox and a Dilemma

10 November 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: How glut-theorists may express disagreement with the assertion of A if Boolean negation cannot be expressed in their language? A glut-theorist’s answer is by denying or rejecting A: To make up for the lack of exclusive negation, a glut-theorist like Priest introduces the notion of denial or rejection of a sentence, understood as a speech act, as clearly distinguished from the acceptance of the negation of A. I argue that the proposal meets some difficulties: the reason is that if the exclusivity of negation is the key to solving the semantic paradoxes, the exclusivity of denial/rejection land us back in paradox. I sketch a bilateral logic of exclusive denial for glut theorists – an extension of the Logic of Paradox (LP) and I observe that exclusive deniability – a key semantic notion of the logic – is not expressible in a dialetheist’s language. I conclude that glut theorists are faced with a dilemma: either denial can serve as means to express disagreement, but the notion of exclusive deniability is not expressible in the glut theorist’s language, or deniability is expressible, but denial may no longer serve as a means to express disagreement.

Bogdan Dicher

LANCOG Universidade de Lisboa

The Original Sin of Proof-Theoretic Semantics
(joint work with Francesco Paoli)

3 November 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Logical inferentialists hold that the meaning of the logical constants is determined by the rules of inference which govern their behaviour in proofs. In the inferentialist tradition, one usually identifies the derivability relation of a logic with the logic’s (internal) consequence relation. This leads to departures from the orthodox Tarskian view according to which a consequence relation is reflexive, monotonic, and transitive. Our aim is to show that the inferentialist account of the meaning of the logical constants can keep very close to the Tarskian paradigm. Using the Blok-Jonsson theory of abstract consequence relations, we show how meanings can be seen to be determined inferentialistically within the bounds of a reflexive, monotonic and transitive consequence relation.

O Núcleo de Estudos Simmelianos da Universidade de Lisboa, associado ao grupo PRAXIS do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, pretende dar a conhecer e debater o pensamento do filósofo Georg Simmel através de sessões de estudo e conferências.

Estas sessões serão quinzenais, estando divididas em duas modalidades: uma de estudo e troca de ideias e outra em modo de seminário público ( onde serão convidados especialistas na área).

Para mais informações contactar: 
nestudossimmelianos@gmail.com
ou
maribel.sobreira@campus.ul.pt

NES_UL cartaz  - cópia

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri

Bielefeld University

Modals and Conditionals are Ambiguous

27 October 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Following Angelika Kratzer’s classic work on modals and conditionals, the consensus in natural language semantics is that modals and conditionals (which are often thought to be a kind of modal) are indexical – in the sense that their contents depend on context – but not ambiguous. I argue that the consensus is mistaken: modals and conditionals are both indexical and ambiguous. That the difference between objective (or circumstantial) and epistemic interpretations of these expressions is not a matter of indexicality can be seen by studying the ways in which they interact with other indexicals. I reconstruct the view that modals and conditionals are only indexical using standard two-dimensional semantics for indexicals, and I show that it cannot handle the modal/indexical interaction. I then give an alternative (three-dimensional) semantics that treats modals and indexicals on their objective and epistemic readings as pairs of (indexical) homonyms, and I show that it can handle the interaction.

Catarina Dutilh Novaes

University of Groningen

The Beauty(?) of Mathematical Proofs

20 October 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Mathematicians often use aesthetic vocabulary to describe mathematical proofs: they can be beautiful, elegant, ugly, etc. In recent years, philosophers of mathematics have begun to ask themselves what these descriptions in fact mean: should we take them literally, as tracking truly aesthetic properties of mathematical proofs, or are these terms being used as proxy for non-aesthetic properties? Starting from the (largely dialogical) idea that one of the main functions of mathematical proofs is to explain and convince, I argue that most of the properties typically associated with beautiful proofs are ultimately epistemic properties. There is however an ‘aesthetic’ residue that is not to be immediately reduced to the epistemic import of proofs, namely the surprising effect that a proof may have. I argue that this aspect is rather to be understood as eliciting an affective response in the proof’s recipient, which in turn plays an important role in a proof’s persuasive effect.

Catarina Dutilh Novaes

University of Groningen

The Social Epistemology of Argumentation

16 October 2017, 16:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa

Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Humans are famously a highly social species, and without collaboration with conspecifics a human being stands no chance to survive. At the same time, we compete with one another for resources at multiple levels. This combination of interdependence and competition means that exchange of information and of epistemic resources more generally among humans becomes a complex affair, involving both trust and vigilance. In my talk, I discuss the role of argumentation in the circulation and production of epistemic resources, relying on insights from social exchange theory, social epistemology, and argumentation theory.