Doing Metaphysics in Non-Classical Logic – Workshop

February 22, 2018


Lisbon 22–23 February 2018

Organiser: Elia Zardini


Metaphysics offers its own conundrums, where a set of prima facie plausible principles apparently governing certain metaphysical notions (existence, change, composition etc.) can apparently be shown to be jointly untenable. Traditional approaches to such problems have typically focussed on rejecting one or the other of the metaphysical principles involved. However, at least in some cases, the reasoning supposed to show the untenability of the relevant metaphysical principles is nothing less than sustained, distinctively classical reasoning, similar to that at work in well-known paradoxes such as e.g. the Liar paradox or the Sorites paradox. While philosophers of logic have long been exploring the prospects of solving the latter paradoxes by revising classical logic, metaphysicians have only recently started to investigate non-classical approaches to puzzles in their area. The workshop aims at fostering this incipient kind of approach in metaphysics and at advancing our understanding of the role played by logic in the structure of certain metaphysical problems.



Thursday 22 February

10.00–11.30: Graham Priest, “Objects That Are Not Objects”

Coffee break

11.50–13.20: Jordi Valor, “Knowing That P and Not-P Are Both True”


14.40–16.10: Ira Kiourti, “Impossible Worlds: A Hyper-Extensional Metaphysics”

Coffee break

16.30–18.00: TBA


Friday 23 February

10.00–11.30: Aaron Cotnoir, “How to Make Donuts and Cut Things in Half”

Coffee break

11.50–13.20: Zach Weber, “Observations on the trivial world”


14.40–16.10: Elia Zardini, “Change without Contra(di)ction”

Coffee break

16.30–18.00: Stewart Shapiro, “On Continuity”


The workshop will take place at the Faculty of Letters of the University of Lisbon (address: Alameda da Universidade), room B2 (in the Mapoteca, near the Library). Registration is free, but if you plan to attend you must let Sara Vargas know at: