HPhil Seminar: 9 March 2017
9 March 2017, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, SalaMatos Romão
Being, Parts, and Wholes in Sophist 243D8-244A2
Simon Noriega-Olmos (Universidade de Lisboa)
The argument against the Dualists at Sophist 243D8-244A2 probably has not received the attention it deserves. I would like to suggest that the main purpose of the argument is to show that a consistent theory of reality must fulfill two basic conditions. First, it cannot simply postulate entities, but it must also take on account that those entities hold relations. And second, if relations are to hold between entities, entities must come in different ontological sorts or ‘categories’. By arguing that this is the lesson to be learnt from the argument against the Dualists at Sophist 243D8-244A2, I additionally show that this argument not only has obvious connections with the refutation of Monism and Parmenides at 244B6-245D11, but perhaps also less obvious connections with the Late Learners’ argument introduced later at 251B7-C2. In what follows, I’ll present the argument, assess its two main current different readings, and shed light on its ontological and linguistic implications.